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FAMILIAL NORMS AND NORMALITY
Clare Huntington*
ABSTRACT
Social norms exert a powerful influence on families. They shape major life
decisions, such as whether to marry and how many children to have, as well as
everyday decisions, such as how to discipline children and divide household
labor. Emotion is a defining feature of these familial social norms, giving
force and content to norms in contexts as varied as reproductive choice,
parenting, and same-sex relationships. These emotion-laden norms do not
stand apart from the law. Falling along a continuum of involvement that
ranges from direct regulation to choice architecture, state sway over social
norms through their emotional valence is an under-recognized aspect of the
family-state relationship.
Although scholars have explored aspects offamilial social norms, current
accounts offer an incomplete picture of both families and family law because
they insufficiently account for the elemental relationship between social norms,
emotion, and the state. By exploring the confluence of these forces, this Article
makes two contributions to the literature. Descriptively, this Article identifies
the centrality of emotion in creating and defining familial social norms. First,
emotion is often the content of a familial social norm; therefore it is impossible
to understand the norm without understanding emotion. Second, emotions can
trigger social norms, with particular emotions leading to changes in behavior.
Third, familial social norms carry tremendous emotional weight, which
explains why the cost of noncompliance can be particularly high in the family
context. Finally, the emotion-laden nature of familial social norms
complicates any predictive enterprise for law and policy.
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Normatively, a more complete understanding of the operation of familial
social norms allows for more effective regulation offamilies. The state should
recognize that emotion is a powerful point of entry when it seeks to influence
norms and shape behavior. There are risks to this influence, but exposing the
uncomfortable reality that the law often tries to manipulate our affective lives
creates an opportunity to use this dynamic for more appealing ends, such as
cultivating greater tolerance for parental conduct that falls outside dominant
norms.
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INTRODUCTION
A young boy hits his brother in a crowded subway, and his father's mind
races while deciding how to discipline the child. A young woman and man
anxiously discuss the future of their relationship, trying to decide whether to
marry, move in together, or remain in separate homes. A thirty-nine-year-old
single woman considers using donated sperm to become pregnant and raise a
child on her own. A gay couple puzzles through who should attend the
Mother's Day celebration at their children's school. A mother contemplates
breastfeeding her baby in a crowded public park. A teenager considers having
sex with his girlfriend. A lesbian, not out in her workplace, ponders bringing
her partner to the annual holiday party. A visibly pregnant woman decides
whether to order a glass of wine in a restaurant. Another woman considers
terminating her pregnancy. A couple thinks seriously about homeschooling
their young children.
These kinds of decisions, momentous and prosaic, form the core of family
life. Yet no one makes them independently. Instead, individuals make these
decisions within a tight web of social norms. Social norms are generally
understood to be the rules of behavior that individuals follow independent of
legal obligation or formal penalty for noncompliance. 1  The power of social
norms comes from the understanding that individuals are attentive to the views
of others, seeking their approval and avoiding disapproval.2
While social norms affect behavior in nearly every realm of human life,
norms particularly shape the relationships and intimate decisions that fall
within the ambit of family law.3 These powerful influences often eclipse the
1 See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REv. 338,
340 (1997) (explaining that norms refer "to informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to
follow"); see also JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY: A STUDY OF SOCIAL ORDER 101 (1989) (stating that
social norms rely "on informal sanctions and the voice of conscience," whereas the law provides formal
punishment). A typical definition of social norms is that they are "social attitudes of approval and disapproval,
specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done." Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social
Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 903, 914 (1996).
2 Richard H. McAdams, An Attitudinal Theory of Expressive Law, 79 OR. L. REV. 339, 342 (2000). This
sensitivity to the approval and disapproval of others means that community members play an important role in
sanctioning undesirable behavior. See Eric A. Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L.
REv. 1697, 1699 (1996) ("[A] norm constrains attempts by people to satisfy their preferences.").
3 Although there are several accounts of the role of social norms in shaping familial behavior, these
explorations have paid insufficient attention to the importance of emotion. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig &
Steven L. Nock, "I Only Want Trust": Norms, Trust and Autonomy, 32 J. SoCiO.-ECON. 471, 478-85 (2003)
(arguing that custody rules contribute to a loss of trust by society toward a noncustodial parent, which in turn
undermines parenting norms); Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA.
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significance of direct legal regulation of families. 4 For example, although the
state does not require parents to raise children in a certain manner, community-
specific social norms influence nearly all aspects of parenting, such as where a
child sleeps at night, whether and for how long to breastfeed, and how much
screen time to allow a child.5  It is hard to imagine a family that operates
independent of at least some social norms, even if the family is merely
rebelling against the norms.6
If social norms are integral to familial behavior, emotion is integral to these
norms. The father in the subway is conscious that, based on the disciplinary
measure he chooses, others will pass judgment on how much he loves his
child. The lesbian knows that some in her community will embrace her
relationship out of loving acceptance while others will react with disgust. The
woman pondering artificial insemination understands that many people vilify
single mothers. The breastfeeding mother may face everything from revulsion
to sexual desire from passersby. The pregnant woman considering an abortion
knows that her decision will be met with judgments about her maternal
instincts and that some will see her as selfish and unfeeling or worse.
The emotional component of social norms is unsurprising because emotion
is interwoven into all aspects of human life, particularly family life. Critical
turning points as well as daily familial interactions can generate multiple
emotions, including love, joy, concern, sympathy, and forgiveness, as well as
anger, guilt, fear, and resentment-often in complex and conflicting patterns.
Further, although the family is often conceptualized as a private institution, it
has a public, decidedly performative, aspect to it. Accordingly, in addition to
strong and varied emotions in families, there can be a tumult of emotions about
families.
L. REV. 1901, 1902-03 (2000) (describing the complicated relationship between the law and social norms
surrounding marriage). For further discussion of the existing literature on familial social norms, see infra Part
I.C.
4 Emphasizing the importance of familial social norms is not intended to understate the centrality of
direct regulation, particularly in determining entry and exit from families. For example, when the state refuses
to recognize the relationship between the partners in a same-sex couple, the state fundamentally affects that
couple's ability to function as a family. The point is that familial social norms often start where direct
regulation ends, and that a tremendous amount of family life takes place outside the direct reach of formal law.
5 As discussed below, familial social norms vary greatly by community, and therefore it is not possible
to say that any one social norm predominates. See infra text accompanying notes 91-102. The power of
familial social norms, however, remains constant.
6 See, e.g., Lisa W. Foderaro, Naming Children for Nazis Puts Spotlight on the Father, N.Y. TIES, Jan.
20, 2009, at A28 (describing the public outrage directed toward parents who named their children Adolf Hitler
Campbell and JoyceLynn Aryan Nation Campbell).
[Vol. 59
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The powerful emotions that attend intimate relationships and personal
choices give exceptional strength to familial social norms. As this Article
elaborates, emotion plays several key roles in familial social norms. First,
because emotion often provides the content of a familial social norm, it is
impossible to understand the norm without understanding emotion. For
example, a prevailing norm is that parents love their children, but without
understanding parental love, it is difficult to understand what the norm
encompasses. Second, emotion can instigate norms. Thus, although views on
corporal punishment have changed over the years,7 parents are often urged to
spank or refrain from spanking out of love for the child. 8 Third, familial social
norms carry tremendous emotional weight, which explains why the cost of
noncompliance can be particularly high in the family context. If the father in
the subway smacks his child across the face, he will be seen as a brute who
does not love his child. Finally, the emotion-laden nature of familial social
norms complicates any predictive enterprise. To complete the example,
dominant theories of norm generation do not account for the complex
emotional enterprise of parenting and therefore are less reliable in predicting
how a father contemplating discipline will react to a change in norms or how
different norms might emerge.
Emotion-laden social norms in the familial context do not stand apart from
the law. Instead, the state helps shape these norms by changing the emotional
context of intimate and personal decision making. When the state enacts a law
requiring that women seeking an abortion be offered the opportunity to view a
sonogram of the fetus, the state contributes to the social norm that seeks to
cloak reproductive decisions in guilt.9  When the state passes legislation
allowing workers to meet family responsibilities, the state helps shape norms
regarding working parents by sending the message that loving parents can also
engage in paid labor. 1° And when a local official interprets a law as
7 See infra note 170.
8 Compare WILLIAM SEARS ET AL., THE BABY BOOK 349 (2d ed. 2003) (noting that "spanking keeps a
parent from learning the real cause of a child's misbehavior and finding a more appropriate method"), with
JOHN ROSEMOND, THE WELL-BEHAVED CHILD: DiScPINE THAT REALLY WORKS! 15 (2009) (advocating the
well-timed spank because "your love for him is why you simply will not let him get away with misbehavior").
9 See Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a Protected Choice,
56 UCLA L. REv. 351, 351 (2008). For further discussion of this example, see infra Part H.A. 1.
10 For an example of such a law, see Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006)
(stating it is the purpose of the Act "to balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of families, to
promote the stability and economic security of families, and to promote national interests in preserving family
integrity"). Of course, this message is complex and varies by economic class. When the federal government
refashioned welfare into "Temporary Assistance to Needy Families," requiring recipients to work, it helped
2010]
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sanctioning same-sex marriage, that action sends a strong signal about the
dignity of same-sex couples in that community.11
The aims of this Article are first to illuminate the state's role in shaping
familial social norms, focusing in particular on the role of emotion, and then to
integrate that understanding into more effective state regulation. 12  To begin
this examination, this Article draws upon the methodology of the growing field
of law and emotion. Scholars in this field are interested in the relationship
between emotion and the law, seeking to identify and understand the emotional
aspects of a legal issue and then use that knowledge for normative ends.
13
Scholars have begun to engage in a law-and-emotion analysis of family law,
although to date that analysis has focused largely on direct state regulation, not
on social norms and other forms of indirect regulation. 14  Accordingly, this
Article develops an understanding of family law centered on insights into the
operation of-and the elemental relationship among-emotion, social norms,
and the state. This novel approach yields a more nuanced family law, with the
shape work-family norms, but this time with a very clear message to low-income families that raising children
should not be done on the federal dime. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2006))
(explaining that one purpose of the Act is to "end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by
promoting job preparation, work, and marriage").
11 See infra text accompanying notes 187-198.
12 See Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who's Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV.
(forthcoming May 2010) (manuscript at 28-57, on file with Emory Law Journal) (identifying three aspects of
law-and-emotion scholarship: illumination, investigation, and integration). For further discussion, see infra
Part I.C.
13 See Abrams & Keren, supra note 12.
14 See Clare Huntington, Repairing Family Law, 57 DUKE L.J. 1245, 1245-46 (2008) [hereinafter
Huntington, Repairing Family Law] (analyzing laws governing the family through a law-and-emotion lens);
see also Clare Huntington, Embracing the Affective Family, 33 HARv. J.L. & GENDER 321, 324-26 (2010)
[hereinafter Huntington, Embracing the Affective Family] (arguing that family law scholars should explore the
complexity of emotion in family law and not reject this line of inquiry merely because the family has been
caricatured as altruistic); Clare Huntington, Happy Families? Translating Positive Psychology into Family
Law, 16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 385, 385 (2009) (arguing that family law should draw upon the field of
positive psychology to determine the what, why, and how of state regulation). Other treatments of emotion
and family law also focus on direct regulation. See Solangel Maldonado, Cultivating Forgiveness: Reducing
Hostility and Conflict After Divorce, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 441, 482-94 (2008); Katharine B. Silbaugh,
Money as Emotion in the Distribution of Wealth at Divorce, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 234, 234 (Robin Fretwell
Wilson ed., 2006) (contending that the ALI Principles wrongly distinguish financial from nonfinancial matters,
ignoring the emotional component of financial bargains in a marriage: "Finances are not distinct from
emotions in relationships, but are an avenue through which spouses express emotions."). The interest in
emotion and family law is growing, as evidenced by a conference held at the University of Virginia in 2008.
See Center for Children, Families, and the Law, University of Virginia, Law and Emotion: Re-Envisioning
Family Law (Sept. 18-19, 2008), http://www.virginia.edu/ccfl/conference.php. The papers for this conference
can be found at 16 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 301, 301-513 (2009).
[Vol. 59
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relationship between families and the state understood to encompass not
simply the direct regulation of families, but other forms of state influence as
well, particularly the state's power to affect social norms through their
emotional valence.
15
To understand this phenomenon more fully, this Article uses three
examples: reproductive rights, parenting, and same-sex marriage. Revealing
the many layers and aspects of family law enriches the conversation about how
the state should approach these and other critical issues at the center of family
law. The current understanding of family law results in a truncated debate, at
least in some areas, because of a failure to recognize that these issues are
subject to state influence at the confluence of emotion and social norms.16
This Article makes both a descriptive and a normative contribution to the
literature. As a descriptive matter, existing accounts of social norms in the
family are incomplete because they do not address the role of emotion in both
creating and perpetuating social norms, nor do existing accounts incorporate
the state's use of emotion as a tool for shaping social norms. Once we add
emotion to the current accounts, we can develop a more robust understanding
of familial social norms and the state's role in shaping these norms.
Foregrounding the distinctive role of emotion explains both the particular
strength of familial social norms and why social norms can be such an
effective, if also potentially pernicious, means of regulating behavior in the
family law context.
As a normative matter, a better understanding of the operation of these
norms forms the basis for more effective regulation of families. Emotion
provides the point of entry for the state to influence familial social norms.
15 As discussed infra Part I.A.1, although direct state regulation of families is both foundational and
widespread, it is only one manifestation of state influence. The state shapes family life in numerous ways,
such as offering incentives, constructing choice architecture, and, importantly, influencing social norms. See
RIcHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINEss 3 (2008) (defining choice architecture as the ability of the choice architect, often the state, to
describe, frame, or present choices in a manner that predictably affects decisions). Understanding the state's
role in shaping familial social norms requires an appreciation of the role of emotion in these norms because
when the state seeks to shape social norms, it often uses emotion as a tool to exert influence.
16 As explored more fully below, the dynamic by which social norms are shaped by emotional responses
is not completely hidden. See infra text accompanying notes 207-216. In some contexts, the emotional
resonance is on the surface, such as the role of disgust in the same-sex marriage debate. See infra text
accompanying notes 187-199. By contrast, in other contexts, such as the child welfare system, many
individuals may be less attuned to this dynamic, perhaps because it is hard to imagine being subject to its
constraints.
2010]
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There are real risks to this influence, but exposing the uncomfortable reality
that the law often tries to manipulate our affective lives creates the possibility
that we might use this dynamic for more appealing ends, such as cultivating
greater tolerance for family choices and parental conduct falling outside the
dominant norms.
More generally, this Article's insights are important to scholarship about
social norms. A few scholars have recognized the role of emotion in social
norms in other areas, such as criminal law and corporate culture. 17 There has
not, however, been a systematic attempt to incorporate the role of emotion into
existing accounts of social norms. This Article demonstrates the value of
doing so and creates a template for such an examination. It also provides a
working middle ground between current accounts of social norms, which are
dominated by rational-choice and law-and-society theories. The former
discounts factors such as emotion, rendering the accounts of social norms
unrecognizable as a descriptive matter, and the latter over-contextualizes social
norms, robbing the accounts of any predictive value. 18  This Article
demonstrates the necessity of considering emotion as a particularly salient
aspect of social norms.
Finally, this Article continues the scholarly project of mapping the affective
family. As described elsewhere, 19 the goal is to disentangle-by identifying,
questioning, and understanding-the emotions at play in familial relationships.
With a more nuanced understanding of the role of emotion in families, we can
begin to examine how the law exploits and cultivates emotion and how the law
might better account for the complexity and variety of emotions. Building
upon the exploration of the role of emotion in the direct regulation of
17 See Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law: A Theory of Social Norms and
Organizational Cultures, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 390, 391 (1994) (discussing the role of remorse in corporate
culture); Dan M. Kahan, The Anatomy of Disgust in Criminal Law, 96 MICH. L. REv. 1621, 1656 (1999)
(dissecting the role of disgust in criminal law and, in particular, noting the relationship between disgust and
social norms). Similarly, the economist Robert Frank has contended that rational-choice theories provide
considerable room for "noble motives" in addition to self-interest. ROBERT H. FRANK, PASSIONS WITHIN
REASON: THE STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIONS, at xi (1988); see also id. at 4 ("My claim ... is that
passions often serve our interests very well indeed. The apparent contradiction arises not because of any
hidden gains from the impassioned actions themselves, but because we face important problems that simply
cannot be solved by rational action.").
18 See infra Part II.C (discussing this debate).
19 See Huntington, Embracing the Affective Family, supra note 14, at 325-26.
[Vol. 59
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families, this Article addresses the subject of social norms, an enormouslyimportant factor in familial decision making.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the intersection of
social norms, emotion, and the state in family law. To make these
observations concrete, Part II excavates three sites of contention in
contemporary family law: reproductive choice, parenting, and same-sex
relationships. This Part demonstrates how, in each case, adding emotion to
current theories of social norms lays the foundation for both a sound
understanding of the operation and power of familial social norms and a
sufficient formalization of the norms necessary for the formulation of policy
and laws. Part III turns to the normative implications of this analysis,
beginning with the potentially pernicious side of familial social norms and
state influence. Using child abuse and neglect as a case study for illustrating
the potential value of harnessing the emotional valence of social norms, this
Part argues that the state role need not be so troubling.
I. THE INTERSECTION OF SOCIAL NORMS, EMOTION, AND THE STATE IN
FAMILY LAW
The state influences families in numerous, often overlapping ways. Direct
regulation-such as rules determining who may get married and establishing
the terms of divorce-is a visible and important part of how the state shapes
families. But these mandatory rules are only one aspect of the family-state
relationship; the state shapes family life in many other, less visible ways. State
sway over social norms is a particularly underappreciated form of state
influence. When the state influences social norms in the family, it often does
so through emotion. Before examining that dynamic, however, it is important
to describe more fully the place of familial social norms in state regulation and
the place of emotion in family life.
Accordingly, this Part begins by placing social norms along a continuum of
state influence over families and providing a brief overview of the current
understanding of social norms. It then develops the role of emotion in
families, identifying emotions in the family and emotions about the family.
This Part concludes with an overview of the current literature, arguing that
20 See Huntington, Repairing Family Law, supra note 14, at 1245-46 (using a law-and-emotion lens to
analyze laws governing the family).
2010]
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scholars have overlooked the important confluence of social norms, emotion,
and family law.
A. Social Norms and the State
1. The Spectrum of State Roles in Familial Decision Making
Beginning with direct regulation, the state controls families through
mandatory rules that determine both who is eligible for the legal moniker
"family" and what legal obligations and rights flow from that denomination.
For example, family law determines who may marry or enter into a domestic
partnership or civil union21 and when a parental relationship between an adult
22
and a child will be legally recognized. Family law also determines when
legal relationships terminate, establishing standards for voluntary ends to a
relationship, such as a marital dissolution 23 or the relinquishment of a child for
adoption,24 and an involuntary end, such as a state action terminating parental
rights.25
Although the state typically does not intervene directly during the course of
a relationship, family law still dictates the obligations family members owe to
26one another, such as the duty of a parent to support and educate a child, and
certain spousal duties. 27 To be sure, some of these obligations can be altered
by agreement between the parties; the recognition of premarital agreements is
21 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2009) (listing the requirements for a domestic partnership);
750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/201 (2009) (limiting marriage to a union between a man and woman); N.Y. DOM. REL.
LAW § 5 (McKinney 2009) (declaring void all marriages between certain relatives).
22 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 742.091 (2009) (creating a legal fiction that the child was born in wedlock
where the parents marry after birth of the child); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 45/5 (2009) (requiring, inter alia,
marriage or a signed acknowledgement of parentage to establish legal presumption of paternity for fathers).
23 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 299 (West 2009) (listing requirements for the termination of a domestic
partnership); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 2009) (listing grounds upon which the state will grant a
divorce).
24 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 8604 (West 2009) (listing legal requirements for a parent or parents to consent
to the adoption of their child); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 50/8 (2009) (requiring consent to adoption or surrender of
parental rights by biological parents as a prerequisite to adoption of a child unless the state deems it
appropriate to intervene, such as by finding the parents unfit by clear and convincing evidence).
25 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 39.806 (2009) (listing grounds for the termination of parental rights); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.206 (Vernon 2009) (granting court authority to terminate a parent-child relationship
upon clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination).
26 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3900 (West 2009) (requiring parents of a minor child to "support their
child in the manner suitable to the child's circumstances"); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3212 (McKinney 2009) (listing
parental duties regarding children's education).
27 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 721 (West 2009) (listing duties owed between spouses).
[Vol. 59
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one example of the state accommodating individual preferences. 28  Overall,
however, the state is the gatekeeper for entry to, and exit from, families and
determines most obligations that run between family members.
29
Moving away from direct regulation, the state also influences families by
enacting legal rules that provide incentives or subsidies that shape familial
behavior. For example, voluntary programs-such as Head Start, which
30provides early childhood education to children in low-income families, and
the Nurse-Family Partnership, which funds visits by nurses to first-time
mothers at risk of committing child abuse or neglect1-are ways in which the
state attempts to influence families on an opt-in basis. Further, through
affordable housing tax credits and public transportation subsidies, the state
enables people to live and work near schools and day care centers. 32 Finally,
when the state regulates the workplace-for example, by enacting equal
opportunity legislation that promotes the entry of women into the paid labor
market or enacting other employment laws-the state affects a parent's ability
to provide financially for her children.33 The effect of this type of regulation
can also be less tangible, playing a role in defining family ideals. For example,
equal opportunity legislation and subsidized child care help send a message
28 See D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUsAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 118-30 (4th ed. 2010) (discussing the varying legal treatment of premarital contracts, their
increasing popularity, and the recent trend by courts to find such contracts enforceable absent
unconscionability).
29 See Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law, 57 STAN. L. REv. 825, 834-41 (2004) (describing
how the purported change in family law-from a system that assigns rights and responsibilities to individuals
based on their status (e.g., married, single) to a system that allows individuals to contract for the rights and
responsibilities they prefer-is overstated). Regulation involving the family does not always run directly from
the state to a family member. It can also run to third parties, such as an employer. The Family and Medical
Leave Act (FMLA), for example, requires qualifying employers to provide employees an unpaid leave of
absence to care for newly-born or adopted children or seriously ill parents. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a) (2006).
30 See 42 U.S.C. § 9833 (2006) (providing discretionary financial assistance for five years to qualifying
agencies seeking to establish a Head Start program).
31 See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention (OJJDP), OJJDP Model Programs Guide, Nurse-Family Partnership, http://www2.dsgonline.com/
mpg/mpgprogram detail.aspx?ID=368&title=Nurse-Family Partnership.
32 See Katharine B. Silbaugh, Women's Place: Urban Planning, Housing Design, and Work-Family
Balance, 76 FoRDHIAM L. REv. 1797, 1798, 1818-50 (2007) (describing "the role of urban planning and
housing design in frustrating the effective balance of work and family responsibilities").
33 See Maxine Eichner, Children, Parents, and the State: Rethinking Relationships in the Child Welfare
System, 12 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 448, 461-63 (2005) (discussing the "complicated interrelationship between
families and the state," and how the law shapes family functioning).
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that women can, and at least for individuals receiving public subsidies, should
work.34
Moving even further away from direct regulation, the state influences
families by describing, framing, or presenting choices in a manner that affects
decisions.35  Through this "choice architecture, 36 the state can profoundly
sway families, although the architecture is often unseen. The default rules on
distribution of property at the dissolution of a marriage are an example of
choice architecture at work in family law. In most states, the default rule is
one of equitable property distribution. Under this regime, each spouse
typically has a claim to marital property, regardless of who purchased the
property.37  To be sure, individuals can contract around these rules through
pre- and post-nuptial agreements, 38 but given the optimism most individuals
express about the longevity of their own marriage, 39 the default rule is applied
more often than not.40
Through this default rule, the state influences familial outcomes. For
example, in the common scenario where one person in the couple invests in the
family while the other invests in a career, 41 the default rule ensures that the
individual with less earning potential still has a claim to marital assets, even
though that person may not have provided the money that purchased the assets.
The state is thus sending a signal that marriage is a partnership, and it is
backing up this signal with an asset-division rule that reflects this view of
marriage.
34 See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193,
110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 608(a)(7) (2006)) (limiting federal assistance to five years
for families with a minor child).
35 See THALER & SuNSTEN, supra note 15, at 3.
36 See id.
37 See HoMER H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 589-604 (2d ed.
1988).
38 See id.
39 See Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: Perceptions and
Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 LAw & HuM. BEHAV. 439, 439, 446-47 (1993).
40 This rule is particularly important in light of the uneven investments many couples make in career
versus family. See John Monahan & Jeffrey Swanson, Lawyers at Mid-Career: A 20-Year Longitudinal Study
of Job and Life Satisfaction, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 451, 465-66 (2009) (documenting this phenomenon
for 1990 graduates of the University of Virginia Law School and finding a direct correlation between the
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State sway over social norms is yet another type of unseen state regulation.
The principle of family autonomy-that families operate largely without state
interference-means that the state leaves many decisions, both momentous and
banal, to individual choice. 42 As a result, social norms often play a far more
important, and certainly more pervasive, role in shaping familial behavior than
direct legal regulation. These social norms affect many of the most important
aspects of family life, from reproductive decisions, to parenting, to the family
form itself. As Part II describes, the state plays an active part in creating and
perpetuating these social norms. For now, it is sufficient to note that social
norms are one aspect of state regulation and that the state's influence in this
arena is often not perceived.
To set forth this taxonomy is not to suggest that these categories are
watertight; many forms of regulation bleed into one another. For example,
when the state enacts a law requiring the use of child-restraint systems for
young children traveling in cars,43 the state is both directly regulating families
and influencing social norms. Most parents would not dream of putting a
toddler in the car without strapping her into a car seat-not because the parent
fears a ticket, but rather because of the widespread norm of using seat belts and
car seats.44 The precise interaction of laws and social norms, a topic of great
debate, is developed in the following section. The point here is simply that
forms of state regulation are often overlapping.
2. Understanding Social Norms
Before turning to social norms in the family, it is helpful to develop a basic
understanding of social norms more generally. As noted above, social norms
are typically understood to be the rules of behavior that individuals follow
independent of any legal obligation or formal penalty for noncompliance.45
Although no standard definition of social norms is used consistently in the
literature, scholars emphasize the internal processes that make people feel
42 But see infra text accompanying note 171 (noting the descriptive inaccuracies of family autonomy).
43 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT § 42-4-236(2) (2009) (requiring child-restraint systems in private,
noncommercial passenger cars for children under a certain age and weight).
44 The seat belt example is a familiar one in social norms literature. The intention here is not to explore it
exhaustively, but rather to show the overlap in forms of state regulation. For further discussion of the interplay
of laws governing child restraints and parental behavior, see, for example, McAdams, supra note 1, at 407-08.
45 See id at 340; see also ELSTER, supra note 1, at 101 (stating that social norms rely "on informal
sanctions and the voice of conscience" whereas the law provides formal punishment).
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obliged to follow such norms,46 the broad social consensus around such norms
that is sustained by attitudes of approval and disapproval,4 7 and the particularly
public nature of norm communication and reinforcement.
48
When legal scholars first began to study social norms, many considered
them to be an extralegal influence on behavior. 49  For example, Robert
Ellickson's case study on conflict resolution among cattle ranchers in Shasta
County, California, details how the ranchers regulated themselves wholly
outside the law, instead relying on informal social norms.50 Similarly, Lisa
Bernstein's study of diamond merchants demonstrates how the merchants
engaged in commercial self-regulation without resort to the legal system.
51
Stewart Macaulay's study of business dealings concludes that individuals try to
52find informal, nonlegal solutions to business problems. This "first
generation" of social norm theorists, then, understands social norms as
independent from formal laws.53
A "second generation" of social norms scholars has focused on the
interplay between law and social norms, arguing that the two regulate behavior
46 See McAdams, supra note 1, at 340 ("Roughly speaking, by norms this literature refers to informal
social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow .... ").
47 See ELSTEz, supra note 1, at 99 ("For norms to be social, they must be (a) shared by other people and
(b) partly sustained by their approval and disapproval."); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 585, 587 (1998) (defining a social norm as "an effective consensus obligation," where "almost
everyone in a community agrees that they ought to behave in a particular way in specific circumstances, and
this agreement affects what people actually do"); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM.
L. REv. 903, 914 (1996) ("[W]e might, very roughly, understand 'norms' to be social attitudes of approval and
disapproval, specifying what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.").
48 As Elster notes, "to violate a norm in public shows a disdain for public opinion that is often more
severely disapproved of than the norm violation itself Conversely, by hiding the violation, one respects and
upholds the norm." ELSTER, supra note 1, at 109. Thus social norms differ from conventions in that the
failure to follow a social norm typically results in a social sanction, whereas the failure to follow a convention
does not. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural Approach to
Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REv. 1643, 1656 (1996) (describing the difference with
the following example: removing one's hat in church is a social norm, and failure to comply will likely result
in a social sanction, while removing one's hat to escape the heat in a boiler room is a convention with no
accompanying obligation and social sanction).
49 Eric A. Posner, Introduction to SOCIAL NORms, NONLEGAL SANCTIONS, AND TIE LAW, at x (2007).
50 ROBERT C. ELLiCKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOWNEIGHBORS SETTLE DisPuTEs 15-81 (1991).
51 See Lisa Bernstein, Opting out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond
Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STU. 115 (1992) (describing the benefits of extralegal regulation in the diamond
industry and outlining the shortcomings of the American legal system with respect to this industry).
52 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
REv. 55, 55 (1963) ("[B]usinessmen often fail to plan exchange relationships completely, and seldom use legal
sanctions to adjust these relationships or to settle disputes.").
53 Lawrence Lessig, The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 661, 673 (1998).
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in tandem, along with other influences.54 Typical of this approach is the
argument that four forces regulate behavior together: threats of legal sanctions
(formal laws), social norms, markets, and architecture.55 Each of the three
non-legal forces is subject, at least in part, to the law; therefore the law has
both direct and indirect effects on human behavior. 56 Thus, second-generation
norms scholars have demonstrated that law and social norms supplement,
rather than replace, one another.57 Sociologist Steven Nock has distinguished
social norms from enacted laws by contending that, by definition, social norms
are followed by most people, and therefore most people view a social norm as
58legitimate, in contrast to laws, which are sometimes perceived as illegitimate.
The precise interplay between the law and social norms has been the
subject of considerable debate.59 The central scholarly task has been to
determine how the law influences human behavior apart from the relatively
straightforward deterrent effect of legal sanctions. In one account, even
without enforcement, the law can support a desirable norm by "expressing"
it. The law both conveys signals to the public about what people support andreject (their preferences) and concretizes and externalizes what might
54 Id.
" Id. at 662-63. Put slightly differently, Cass R. Sunstein has argued that the state can regulate behavior
directly, or it can attempt to influence behavior by influencing social norms. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at
948-52. Thus, the state has a range of options: educational campaigns (which offer accurate information);
persuasive campaigns (which attempt to alter attitudes and choices); economic incentives and disincentives
(taxes and subsidies); time, place, and manner restrictions (e.g., banning smoking in public places); and
straightforward coercion (e.g., seat belt laws). See id.
56 See Lessig, supra note 53, at 671-72 ("These alternative constraints beyond law do not exist
independent of the law; they are in part the product of the law. Thus the question is never 'law or something
else.' The question instead is always to what extent is a particular constraint a function of the law, and more
importantly, to what extent can the law effectively change that constraint.").
57 See Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA. L. REv. 1989, 1997-2008 (2000) ("Norms can
supplement legal rules by coloring around the rules in a way that informs actors as to whether a rule is a
serious signal, or 'sanction,' or is instead a mere price.").
58 Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REv. 1971, 1973-74 (2000).
59 Richard McAdams summarizes the scholarly inquiry as follows: "Norms matter to legal analysis
because (1) sometimes norms control individual behavior to the exclusion of law, (2) sometimes norms and
law together influence behavior, and (3) sometimes norms and law influence each other." McAdams, supra
note 1, at 347.
60 See id. at 397-98; see also Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2024 (1996) (exploring "the function of law in 'making statements' as opposed to controlling behavior
directly"). The relationship between the expressive function of the law and social norms is quite complex. See
Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1603, 1614-30
(2000) (describing this relationship).
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61otherwise be more abstract and internal. Similarly, the law can influencenorms by changing the social meaning of certain behavior.62
Although numerous theories explain why people comply with social norms,
three stand out. In one account, individuals internalize expectations of
behavior and feel guilty when they do not comply. 63  Another account
emphasizes that individuals experience a loss of esteem from others when they
do not follow social norms, so they seek to avoid this cost by complying with
norms.64  Yet another argues that social norms are the result of repeated
prisoner dilemma games among individuals with ongoing ties to one another.
65
In this last account, social norms are "signals" individuals send to each other
about their willingness to cooperate with one another in the long run, thus
establishing their desirability of becoming, for example, a long-term business
or romantic partner.
66
B. The Salience of Emotion
Before demonstrating the central role that emotion plays in familial social
norms, it is useful to explore emotion in families and family law more
generally. Family law regulates the realm of intimate relationships, most
notably relationships between romantic partners and parents and children.67 A
61 McAdams, supra note 1, at 399-408.
62 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U. Cm. L. REv. 943, 968-73 (1996)
(describing how the social meaning of dueling changed once the law prohibited a dueler from holding public
office, thus altering the prior social signal that dueling was honorable).
63 See Robert Cooter, Do Good Laws Make Good Citizens? An Economic Analysis of Internalized
Norms, 86 VA. L. REv. 1577, 1584-91 (2000) (describing the effect of internalization of values on social
norms; arguing that rational-choice theory is based on the idea of a rational "bad man" calculating his decision
whether to obey a law by determining the costs and benefits of compliance; and further arguing that rational-
choice theory fails to account for people who are internally motivated because they have internalized civic
values); id. at 1593-96 (developing an economic analysis of internalization).
64 McAdams, supra note 1, at 355.
65 For a description of the classic prisoner dilemma game, its variations, and the consequences of repeat
play, see ERIc A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 14-18 (2000).
66 See id at 19; ELLICKSON, supra note 50, at 167-73. Posner's book has been the subject of
considerable criticism for its overly reductionist and all-encompassing approach to social norms. See Richard
H. McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Laws, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 625, 678-
87 (2001) (reviewing Emic A. PosNER, LAW AND SocIA NoRmS (2000)). Posner's book also has been
criticized more sweepingly for its behaviorally unrealistic, politically naive, and morally undesirable account
of human behavior. See Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and
Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REv. 367, 367-68 (2002) (arguing that the behavior Posner identifies as the
result of signaling is better understood as the result of reciprocity).
67 The exact boundary of family law has generated considerable interest of late. See, e.g., Melissa
Murray, The Networked Family: Reframing the Legal Understanding of Caregiving and Caregivers, 94 VA. L.
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defining characteristic of these relationships is their emotional content, which
takes two forms-emotions in the family and emotions about the family. 68 As
a result, legal scholars cannot hope to understand decision making and conflict
resolution in families without an appreciation of the emotional aspect of
familial relationships. Similarly, legal scholars must account for the public's
strong emotional responses to families, responses that equally shape legal
decisions and policy making.
To say that familial relationships have an emotional component is to state
the obvious. To try to summarize the full range and complexity of these
emotions in one article, however, would be challenging to say the least. This
section simply outlines the types of emotions often associated with familial
relationships. This description does not assume that every person in every
familial relationship experiences the same emotions. Still, it is important to
identify, even if briefly, some of the central and well-recognized emotions at
69play within families and in society's reaction to familial issues.
1. Emotions in the Family
Intuitively, it is easy to recognize the deeply emotional context of intimate
and familial relationships. In light of the relative dearth of scholarship
addressing the role of emotion in family law, however, it is useful to discuss at
least some specific emotions and to illustrate how each might surface in
matters relevant to family law.
To begin, emotion is interwoven into every aspect of our lives-the trading
floor, the classroom, the playing field, the street, and the courthouse. Each of
these areas of human activity is marbled with emotion. The emerging
REv. 385, 390-94 (2008) (explaining the role of non-parental caregivers in families); Laura A. Rosenbury,
Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REv. 189, 189 (2007) (exploring the lack of legal recognition for
friendships). This is particularly an issue with respect to same-sex couples. Although there is obviously a
movement to gain legal recognition for such couples, there is also some concern about the regulation and
conformity that accompanies legal recognition. See Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM
L. REv. 2685, 2688 (2008) (arguing that in striving for marriage equality for same-sex couples, society must
remove marriage from its superior status in relation to other forms of relationships).
68 By focusing on emotion, this Article does not adhere to the now fairly disregarded split between
reason and emotion. See ANTONIO DAMASIO, DESCARTES' ERROR: EMOTION, REASON, AND THE HUMAN
BRAiN 53 (1994) (arguing that the "biological machinery of reason" includes emotion). Instead, this Article
assumes that multiple factors, working together and in tension, affect decisions.
69 For a taxonomy of emotions in general, see id. at 149 (describing the five central emotions as
"Happiness, Sadness, Anger, Fear, and Disgust" and noting that each of these five categories has variations,
such as panic and shyness, which are variations of fear).
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neuroscience of brain functioning demonstrates that without emotion, we
cannot function in society, make decisions well, or live a recognizable life.
70
The intention is not to exceptionalize the familial context by contending that
individuals feel emotion only in the familial context, but rather to argue that
emotion, relevant everywhere, is particularly salient in the family context.71
Thus, even set against a backdrop of omnipresent emotion, family law
highlights particularly intense moments of emotion. Divorce, for example, is
generally understood to be one of the greatest emotional upheavals in a
lifetime.y2  The emotional process typically is not linear but rather cyclical,
with emotions moving back and forth between love, anger, and sadness.7 3
Complex and often conflicting emotions play out at various points. Although
some studies show that immediate reactions to transgressions in intimate
relationships can lead to resentment and retaliation, 4 individuals are capable of
forgiveness over time.
75
Divorce litigants often bring their emotions into the legal process. For
example, in a study of the methods divorce attorneys use to help clients settle
cases, scholars observe that even though settlement rather than a full-blown
trial is the typical outcome-and compromise and cooperation does occur-
70 For an excellent primer on this topic, as well as a review of the relevant literature, see id. at 165-201
(arguing that emotion is a key component of reason and that it aids, rather than hinders, decision making). See
JONAH LEHRER, How WE DECIDE 34-42 (2009) (providing a layperson's account of the interplay between
emotion and decision making); see also David J. Arkush, Situating Emotion: A Critical Realist View of
Emotion and Nonconscious Cognitive Processes for Law and Legal Theory, 2008 BYU L. REV. 1275, 1328-
53 (arguing that rational-choice theory, behavioral economics, and cultural-cognition theory all fail to
understand that emotion is part of the decision-making process and not a compromising force). Interestingly,
individuals who, as a result of brain damage or illness, have lost the ability to feel emotions also lose the
ability to follow social norms. See DAMAsio, supra note 68, at 3-14, 32-33 (discussing the famous case of
Phineas Gage, a railroad supervisor who, in 1848, survived the accidental blasting of an iron rod through his
head, damaging what we now know to be the prefrontal cortices, and noting that although he lived and retained
most of his capacities, including speech, the accident fundamentally altered Gage's personality, including his
ability to follow social norms).
71 Susan M. Johnson, Couple and Family Therapy: An Attachment Perspective, in HANDBOOK OF
ATTACHMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND CLINICAL APPLICATIONS 811, 814 (Jude Cassidy & Phillip R. Shaver
eds., 2008) ("Attachment relationships are where our strongest emotions arise and where they seem to have the
most impact.").
72 See ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, AND
MEDIATION 215 (1994) (stating that only a spouse's death is ranked higher than divorce with respect to stress
and noting that divorce involves numerous negative emotions, such as anger, regret, and sadness).
73 See id. at 26-28 (discussing a cyclical theory of grief in divorce).
74 Eli J. Finkel et al., Vengefully Ever After: Destiny Beliefs, State Attachment Anxiety, and Forgiveness,
92 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 871, 871 (2007) (listing these studies).
75 ROBERT E. EMERY, THE TRUTH ABOUT CHILDREN AND DIVORCE: DEALING WITH THE EMOTIONS SO
You AND YOUR CHILDREN CAN THRIVE 26-42, 299-300 (2004).
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settlement negotiations are still contentious, and clients use numerous tactics to
76
maintain the possibility of a contested trial or hearing. This client attitude
shapes attorney responses, and scholars have found that attorneys, under
pressure to identify with the client's world view, cast settlement "as a different
kind of combat, but as combat nonetheless. 77
Emotions also run high in the context of child abuse and neglect. For child
victims, the emotions accompanying abuse and neglect are complex and
include fear, anger, anxiety, guilt, sadness, and bewilderment.7 8 The emotional
response is necessarily complex, and even though a child will almost certainly
experience relief when away from the abuse or neglect, the experience of being
removed from the home, even temporarily, can be deeply traumatizing.79 For
parents who abuse or neglect their children, the emotions are similarly
complex. Parents often experience guilt over the abuse, as well as anger,
denial, and fear of losing a child permanently. 80
Likewise, adoption can evoke complex and conflicting emotions-joy,
guilt, loss, fear, anxiety, and denial-for birth parents, adoptive parents, and
adopted children both at the time of adoption and later.81  This is not to
subscribe to the narrative that parents who relinquish their children are bad
76 AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND TUE CLIENTS: POWER AND
MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 108-09 (1995).
77 Id. at 109.
78 See CHILD PROTECTION: USING RESEARCH TO IMPROVE POLICY AND PRACTICE (Ron Haskins et al.
eds., 2007) (examining the effects of abuse and neglect on children); CYNTHIA CROSSON TOWER,
UNDERSTANDING CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 255 (3d ed. 1996); ANTHONY J. URQUIZA & CYNTHIA WINN,
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., TREATMENT FOR ABUSED AND NEGLECTED CHILDREN: INFANCY TO
AGE 18, at 71-80 (1994), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/treatmen/acknow.cfm.
79 See generally JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT 24-34 (2d ed. 1982) (documenting the psychological and
emotional trauma children experience when separated from their mothers); JoHN BOWLBY, Loss: SADNESS
AND DEPRESSION 7-14, 397-411, (1980); JOHN BOWLBY, SEPARATION: ANXIETY AND ANGER 13, 245-57
(1973); Wendy L. Haight et al., Parent-Child Interaction During Foster Care Visits, 46 Soc. WORK 325, 337-
38 (2000) (discussing a study on parent-child visitation during separation indicating the importance of
reducing the time the parent and child are separated because of the disruptive impact of separation on the
parent-child relationship and the risk of attachment-related issues for the child).
80 See TOWER, supra note 78, at 255.
81 See Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption and Confidentiality, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN
ADOPTION READER 123, 123 (Naomi R. Cahn & Joan Heifetz Hollinger eds., 2004) ("Adult adoptees cite
health-related, medical, and psychological reasons for wanting to know the identity of their birth parents.
Many are searching to fill in what they claim are missing parts of their identity, for an explanation of why they
were relinquished for adoption, or to reassure their birth parents that they are well.").
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parents, inflicting a primal wound on their children,82 but rather to note that the
emotions surrounding adoption are complex and, of course, will vary with the
individual.83
In all these contexts-divorce, child welfare, and adoption-the loss itself
is complicated because it is potentially revocable, thus making it an
"ambiguous loss., 84 Psychologist Pauline Boss categorizes ambiguous losses
as situations (often in divorced and adoptive families) where an individual is
physically absent but still psychologically present.85  Boss contends that the
uncertainty of ambiguous losses can freeze the grieving process, leading to
cycles of hope and hopelessness.
86
To highlight these more negative emotions is not to obscure the positive
emotions that also abound, at least in some families. For example, in the
United States, people typically enter into romantic and sexual relationships out
of love and desire.87 Although romanticized and oversimplified, individuals
88
often find parenting a deep source of joy and pride, at least in the long run.
Even when relationships hit inevitable bumps, individuals are capable of
tremendous forgiveness and often seek to right the wrongs they have
inflicted.89
82 See Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption and Aspiration: The Uniform Adoption Act, the DeBoer-Schmidt
Case, and the American Quest for the Ideal Family, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 15, 38-40 (1995)
(describing the primal-wound narrative of adoption in American culture).
83 See ANN FESSLER, THE GiRLs WHO WENT AWAY: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF WOMEN WHO
SURRENDERED CHILDREN FOR ADOPTION IN THE DECADES BEFORE ROE V. WADE (2006) (describing the pre-
Roe years when large percentages of young, unmarried women were sexually active but had little access to
birth control and further describing the secrecy of the adoption system where young women who "went away"
to have babies were typically pressured into surrendering their children for adoption, experiencing grief and
guilt for years afterward).
84 See PAULINE Boss, AMBIGUOUS Loss: LEARNING TO LrVE WITH UNRESOLVED GRIEF 8-12, 61-76
(1999).
85 Id. at 8. Boss also defines ambiguous loss to include situations where a person is physically present
but psychologically absent. See id. at 9.
86 Id. at 10-11, 61-76.
87 Historically, economic, political, and social considerations have also influenced these decisions. See
STEPHANIE COONTZ, MARRIAGE, A HISTORY: How LOVE CONQUERED MARRIAGE 26-27 (2005) (identifying
the wide variety of reasons couples have entered into marriage in different cultures and during different time
periods); NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC Vows: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION (2000) (providing a
historical overview of the ways government has shaped the institution of marriage).
88 This may be true for the experience of being a parent writ large, but it is not necessarily true for day-
to-day parenting. See Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience:
The Day Reconstruction Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776, 1777 (2004) (finding that women enjoy child care
slightly more than housework but considerably less than watching television).
89 See Huntington, Repairing Family Law, supra note 14, at 1260-73.
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Finally, family members often feel doubt about their own emotions,
questioning the mismatch between what they feel and expectations of what
they ought to feel. Post-partum depression, for example, can be particularly
painful for women because of the expectation that having a baby is a joyous
event, thus making it more difficult for a woman to admit she is not, in fact,
overjoyed. Similarly, although deciding whether to have an abortion can be a
wrenching decision emotionally, this is not true for all women, leading some
women to question their lack of guilt or regret because it does not accord with
the dominant emotional narrative about abortions.90 Ambivalence and doubt
are thus important emotions and familial experiences.
2. Emotions About the Family
Referring to families as "private" is a common trope, but it does not
account for the tremendous possessiveness some individuals and groups seem
to feel about other people's families. This interest is highly emotional. Small-
scale examples of this are ubiquitous: fathers and mothers at the playground
watch and judge the parenting decisions of other parents; close friends react to
the behavior of each others' partners and spouses; the simple act of a same-sex
couple holding hands in public can spark reactions. Each of these social
interactions involves powerful emotions about the family.
A similar but much broader dynamic plays out at the societal level. The
individuals and groups driving the political process are often motivated by
emotion. Thus, individuals who are not directly affected by a familial issue
often feel that they are affected, or at least have an emotional response to what
goes on in other people's families. For example, many opposite-sex couples
hold strong views about same-sex marriage, and many parents who send their
children to school maintain firm views on homeschooling. Indeed, when
people discuss the so-called "culture wars," they rarely, if ever, mean raging
debates over high versus low art or plays versus musicals; what people
generally invoke are the deep political and social conflicts over matters
involving the most intimate realms of familial and individual choice. The
intense public focus on everything from same-sex marriage, to single-
parenthood, to abortion, to the daily aspects of child rearing is driven by
intense emotions about other people's families and personal choices.
90 See Aspen Baker, Overcoming Stigma: Talking Freely About Abortion, CTR. FOR AM. PROGREss, Aug.
3, 2005, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2005/O8/b939545.html/print.html (describing the responses
of women on a post-abortion talk line and noting that "[m]any are surprised by their lack of guilt or regret, and
fear that their response makes them cruel or callous").
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The intense concern with other people's families is another way to
deconstruct the public-private divide. Frances Olsen has usefully
demonstrated how the public-private line is incoherent, 91 but there is another
way in which families are not private. 92 People feel affected by what goes on
in other people's families. And in some ways, they are. Children, of course,
influence each other, thus moderating the lessons parents try to instill in their
own children. The broader community also influences families, making it
easier or harder for a family to maintain values that run counter to those of the
majority. Think of a conservative, "traditional values" Christian family in
Berkeley, or a same-sex couple in Provo. The Berkeley family knows it will
be harder to pass their values on to their children if most other families in the
community embrace same-sex marriage, and vice-versa.
Although some advocates of same-sex marriage deride opponents with
such slogans as "Focus on Your Own Damn Family, '93 this simplification fails
to account for the reality that we are affected by other people's families. 94 To
be sure, the harm experienced by a same-sex couple who cannot enjoy the
same legal protections as an opposite-sex couple is qualitatively different from
the harm experienced by the family seeking to pass on its traditional values.
The point is simply that what goes on in other people's families is more
broadly relevant than is often credited.
As this example demonstrates, the debate over same-sex marriage is a
compelling illustration of emotions about other people's families. Emotion is
at the center of the debate. Advocates in favor of legal recognition of same-sex
couples seek tangible benefits, such as health care, survivor benefits, and
parental rights to commonly raised children. But the route to these tangible
benefits is through an emotional claim that families headed by same-sex
parents are no different from families headed by opposite-sex parents and
91 Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARv. L.
REv. 1497, 1501-07 (1983); see also Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 835, 835-36 (1985) (examining the role of state intervention in the family).
92 The public aspect of family life is reflected in family law doctrine as well. For example, one of the
components of a common law marriage is that the couple hold themselves out to the community as husband
and wife. See CLARK, supra note 37, at 50-51.
93 This slogan, see CafePress.com, Focus on Your Own Damn Family, http://www.cafepress.com/
designedforyou.21312867 (last visited Mar. 13, 2010), is an obvious play on the conservative organization,
Focus on the Family. See Focus on the Family Homepage, http://www.focusonthefamily.com (last visited Feb.
21,2010).
94 I intend to explore these themes more fully in a separate article, tentatively entitled "Other People's
Families."
[Vol. 59
HeinOnline  -- 59 Emory L.J. 1124 2009-2010
FAMILIAL NORMS AND NORMALITY
therefore deserve the same recognition and protection.95  This is typically
framed as a question of "dignity ' 96 and is, at heart, a claim that individuals in
same-sex relationships love each other and their children in the same way that
individuals in opposite-sex relationships love each other and their children.
97
The claim seeks to cultivate an emotional response in the listener by playing on
the emotions associated with families.
Opponents of legal recognition of same-sex marriage likewise frame
arguments in emotional terms.98 These advocates contend that the recognition
of same-sex marriage (which they sometimes refer to as "counterfeit
marriage") threatens the sanctity of opposite-sex marriage.99 Advocates subtly
95 See, e.g., Opening Brief on the Merits for Petitioners at 42, Clinton v. California decided sub nom. In
re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (2008), superseded by CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 (No. S147999), 2007 WL
1335195 at *42 ("Like heterosexual marriages, same-gender marriages are based on commitment, love and
support. Same-gender homes provide children with safe, supportive and loving environments. Thus, same-
gender marriage would benefit the state by offering more stable homes in which children can be raised by two
committed parents.").
96 See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 399 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5
("These core substantive rights include, most fundamentally, the opportunity of an individual to establish-
with the person with whom the individual has chosen to share his or her life-an officially recognized and
protected family possessing mutual rights and responsibilities and entitled to the same respect and dignity
accorded a union traditionally designated as marriage."). Moreover, even when a state grants access to these
benefits, such as the far-reaching domestic partnership laws in California, see CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6
(West 2009), there is still an emotional battle to be waged. In the case challenging the exclusion of same-sex
couples from marriage, the California Supreme Court found that even though virtually no tangible benefits
were at stake, the state's decision not to allow same-sex couples access to the same legal status as opposite-sex
couples violated state equal protection rights and the right to marry. See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384,
401-02 (Cal. 2008), superseded by CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5 ("Only marriage between a man and a woman is
valid or recognized in California.").
97 As Maxine Eichner argues, dignity is an all-encompassing term, meaning more than simply equal
rights under the law. See MAXINE EICHNER, THE SUPPORTIVE STATE: FAMILIES, GOVERNMENT, AND
AMERICA'S POLITICAL IDEALS (forthcoming July 2010) (manuscript at ch. 6, p. 25, on file with the Emory Law
Journal) (observing that "liberalism's promise of equality is one of equal dignity in society-a dignity that
extends beyond simply equal rights in the law" and noting that racial minorities should not just be recognized
as "politically equal, but ... also socially equal").
98 Here, an "emotional argument," means one that appeals to emotion. See D. Don Welch, Ruling with
the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 55, 59-63, 75-87 (1997) (describing such
arguments and contending that they have a place in public discourse). For example, by displaying disgust,
opponents of same-sex marriage convey the message that such a marriage should not be recognized because
the underlying relationship (or at least the sex) is disgusting. The argument thus taps into the emotions of the
listener. Similarly, an emotional argument can help create emotions. For example, same-sex advocates in
Ireland intended to evoke sympathy and trust by showing a likeable boy-next-door knocking on four million
doors to ask for "Sinead's hand in marriage" and ending with the tag line, "How would you feel if you had to
ask 4 million people for permission to get married?" See Marriage Equality: Civil Marriage for Gay and
Lesbian People, Sinead's Hand, http://www.marriagequality.ie/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2010).
99 See Timothy J. Dailey, Family Research Council, Ten Facts About Counterfeit Marriage,
http://www.frc.org/content/ten-facts-about-same-sex-marriage (last visited Feb. 5, 2010) ("The movement to
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deploy the emotion of disgust to undermine the claim to same-sex marriage.
100
The title of the federal law, the Defense of Marriage Act, 10 1 tellingly suggests
that traditional marriage must be "defended," evoking fear among opposite-sex
couples that they stand to lose something if same-sex couples are recognized-
that same-sex marriage is not just a social or political choice, but some kind of
an assault on traditional marriage.
Similarly, in the child welfare context, individuals not directly involved in
the system have strong feelings about those who are. In addition to concern
and sympathy for children, individuals often feel revulsion and hatred for
parents who abuse or neglect their children, casting them as misfits who are
somehow inhuman. As Martin Guggenheim has stated,
There is a shocking presumption generated by fear, by otherness, by a
lot of things-that the parents of children in foster care are bad for
their children. They don't love them enough or they don't have the
ability enough to raise them well. And I'm here to say that in my 30
years of work in this field, that is the most despicable slander of all,
and the most difficult falsity to refute.
10 2
In sum, emotions about the family can deeply affect public responses to
familial issues. Policy makers and advocates evoke and deploy emotion on a
regular basis, driving decision making and affecting public opinion.103  As
redefine marriage has already found full expression in what is variously called 'polyfidelity' or 'polyamory,'
which seeks to replace traditional marriage with a bewildering array of sexual combinations among various
groups of individuals.").
100 Cf Marc R. Poirier, The Cultural Property Claim Within the Same-Sex Marriage Controversy, 17
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 343, 374-77 (2008) (arguing that opponents of same-sex marriage can be said to be
making a cultural property claim to marriage rites and are arguing that broadening access to these rites
undermines group identity); see also Martha Nussbaum, A Right to Many? Same-Sex Marriage and
Constitutional Law, DISSENT, Summer 2009, at 43, 51 (describing the role of disgust in defining opposition to
same-sex marriage). For a more general discussion of disgust and sexual orientation, see MARTHA C.
NUSSBAUM, FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY: SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2010).
101 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C
(2006)).
102 See Symposium, The Rights of Parents with Children in Foster Care: Removals Arising from
Economic Hardship and the Predictive Power of Race, 6 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 61, 74 (2003) (statement of
Martin Guggenheim).
103 Adoption is another area of family law that evokes strong emotional responses from the public. For
example, the debate over trans-racial adoptions-whether children should be matched with adoptive parents of
the same race-has led to rancorous public and academic debates, with emotions running high on all sides.
See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, NOBODY'S CHILDREN: ABUSE AND NEGLECT, FOSTER DRIFT, AND THE
ADOPTION ALTERNATIVE 7 (1999) (arguing that a pervasive "blood bias" in the child welfare system sacrifices
children's futures); Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoption, 39 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 1415, 1467-68 (2006) (describing white potential adoptive parents' cognitive biases for non-African
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discussed in Part III, these emotions affect familial social norms and are
critical to the generation and transmission of social norms.
C. Social Norms and Emotion in Family Law Scholarship
Despite the significance of social norms and emotion in family life,
scholars generally have not studied the confluence of these two forces. Some
family law scholars have addressed social norms but without sufficient
appreciation of the role of emotion. And some family law scholars have
addressed emotion without a full appreciation of the importance of social
norms. This section identifies that precise point of intersection.
To begin, a few legal scholars have explored the role of social norms in the
familial context. 104  Elizabeth Scott, for example, has made important
contributions to the study of social norms in the context of family law.
Examining the complicated relationship between the law and social norms
surrounding marriage, Scott has described fundamental changes in the legal
framework governing marriage. 10 5 As Scott describes it, marriage moved from
a framework of clear gender roles-with marriage privileged over other
intimate relationships and exit difficult because fault-based divorce grounds
were required-to a framework of gender equality, with easier exit through no-
fault divorce, and less privileged status over other relationships. 106  To Scott,
these legal changes contributed to the weakening of marital commitment
norms, although marriage is still understood as a relationship of
commitment. 107 Scott is skeptical of the argument that this weakening can be
reversed through further legal change because commitment norms are closely
connected to gender norms.10 8  This "bundling" of commitment norms and
American children); National Association of Black Social Workers, Preserving Families of African Ancestry,
http://www.nabsw.org/mserver/PreservingFamilies.aspx (last visited Feb. 21, 2010) (describing the
association's long-standing position that "transracial adoption of an African American child should only be
considered after documented evidence of unsuccessful same race placements has been reviewed and supported
by appropriate representatives of the African American community").
104 Although not speaking directly about social norms, Carl Schneider was perhaps the first scholar to
recognize that one purpose of family law is to shape family life through ways other than direct regulation. See
Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFsTRA L. REv. 495, 496-98 (1992)
(contending that family law has five functions including the expressive function, which is the power of the law
through words and symbols to alter the behavior of individuals regulated by the law).
105 See Scott, supra note 3, at 1904-06.
106 See id.
107 See id.
10' See id. at 1905-06. According to Scott, legal change may generate a one-way (downward) ratchet for
commitment norms because of the influence of gender norms. Any attempt to encourage greater commitment
in marriage provokes a reaction from those who do not want to return to the days of gender inequality. See id.
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gender norms makes it difficult for the law to reinforce marriage because any
attempt to do so is perceived as a return to traditional gender roles.
10 9
Steven Nock has argued that when laws are perceived as illegitimate, they
are unlikely to influence social norms and that this is why legal reforms that
attempt to remove gender from marriage-to equalize marital roles between
men and women-have had so little influence, and instead these roles
persist. 110 He posits that most people, especially men, do not want marriage to
be "genderless," but rather view marriage as a way to realize fully their gender
identity.111 He contends that social norms are context-specific, so although
people reject gender distinctions in public institutions, such as the workplace,
they want to retain them in marriage.
112
Focusing on post-divorce parenting, Solangel Maldonado has argued that
although many fathers in intact relationships are engaged with their children,
post-divorce fathers typically become far less involved with their children over
time. 113 Maldonado contends that for these fathers the social norm is one of
"economic fatherhood" rather than a more robust relationship.1 14 Maldonado
posits that the law has helped create this norm of economic fatherhood and that
it can similarly help create a norm of "involved fatherhood."'1 15 In proposing
various legal reforms that would encourage involved fatherhood, 116 Maldonado
at 1905. For this reason, covenant marriage is perceived as not necessarily (or not only) reinforcing marriage
but also as a return to a time of strict gender differences and stereotypes. Id. Although Scott believes the law
can affect social norms, she is skeptical about the ability of legal reformers to predict the effects because
marriage has become a flash point in the culture wars. Id. at 1906.
109 Scott contrasts this picture of marital social norms with the norms surrounding parental obligation. In
that context, she argues, the law has had greater success in cultivating norms of engagement and commitment,
in part because parental commitment norms are not "bundled" with other norms. See id. at 1905-06, 1947-50;
see also Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REv. 2401, 2436-37 (1995)
(discussing "[t]he utility of parents' affective bonds and informal social norms in promoting desirable
behavior").
110 See Nock, supra note 58, at 1974.
11 See id.at 1975-80.
112 See id. at 1975-80, 1986-87; see also id. at 1974 ("Marriage is the primary locale in which gender is
experienced because it is where our sexual lives are realized."); see also STvEN L. NOCK, MARRIAGE IN
MEN'S LivEs 20-23 (1998).
113 See Solangel Maldonado, Beyond Economic Fatherhood- Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent,
153 U. PA. L. REv. 921, 923-25, 946-49 (2005) (describing this phenomenon and noting some peculiarities,
such as the fact that the fathers that are most involved during marriage are among the most likely to be the
least involved after a divorce).
114 Seeid. at938-46.
115 Seeid. at928.
116 See id at 983-84 (arguing in favor of a presumption ofjoint legal custody and requiring nonresidential
parents to be involved in parenting to help create a social norm of parental involvement post-divorce).
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argues that "[a]ll parents want to be perceived and want to perceive themselves
as good parents. Most parents have internalized the role of 'parent' and
experience guilt if they believe they have failed to be good parents," and
therefore if the expectation is one of involved fatherhood, fathers will
internalize this and feel guilty for not following the social norm.117 Although it
is an important insight, Maldonado leaves the rich depths of this paternal
motivation largely unexamined.118
These scholars typically assume a rational-actor perspective or, more
generally, tend not to consider the role of emotion in familial social norms.119
Understanding the relationship between legal reform and social norms in the
familial context is important, but insights into this dynamic would be even
more trenchant if accompanied by an appreciation of the role of emotion in the
creation, persistence, and modification of these social norms. For example, to
understand better the bundling effect of gender norms and marital norms, it
would be useful to develop an appreciation of emotional attachments and
reactions to gender equality. In light of the strong emotions of family
members surrounding gender roles, social norms of gender equality or
inequality may be particularly sticky. And in light of the strong emotions of
those outside a family about gender roles, there may be a particular kind of
Maldonado acknowledges that the cost of enforcing paternal involvement is too high, but she contends that the
laws would have the effect of encouraging both community enforcement and self-sanctioning. Id. at 1000-08.
Scott is interested in post-divorce parenting as well and has argued that recent custody reforms can be
understood as an attempt to extend the parental autonomy enjoyed by intact families to post-divorce families,
encouraging ongoing relationships and a social norm of involvement. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental
Autonomy and Children's Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1071 n.2, 1072-74 (2003); see also
Brinig & Nock, supra note 3, at 478-85 (describing the loss of societal trust toward a noncustodial parent,
undermining parenting norms for those parents).
117 See Maldonado, supra note 113, at 1006-07.
118 Maldonado identifies emotion as one of the reasons fathers choose not to engage with their children
post-divorce. See id. at 978-79 (citing research that fathers find visits emotionally painful because they are so
brief, intense, and insufficient and because fathers feel guilt over the divorce and therefore often choose to
limit visitation to avoid these unpleasant feelings). Maldonado does not, however, explore these intriguing
insights further.
119 In addition to the scholars described in this section, a few others have addressed social norms as well.
See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J.
393, 415 (1998) (arguing that the lessening of social stigma around divorce may affect divorce rates); Brinig &
Nock, supra note 3, at 474-85 (exploring the role of trust in marriages (internal norms) and post-divorce
parenting (external norms) and concluding that the loss of trust can lead to divorce and that divorce leads to a
loss of societal trust for the noncustodial parent); David D. Meyer, Family Ties: Solving the Constitutional
Dilemma of the Faultless Father, 41 ARIz. L. REv. 753, 806-08 (1999) (arguing that legal recognition or non-
recognition of the right to a relationship with a child affects social norms); Sarah E. Waldeck, Using Male
Circumcision to Understand Social Norms as Multipliers, 72 U. CIN. L. REv. 455, 492-99 (2003) (contending
that social norms play a role in parental decisions about whether to circumcise male infants).
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norm enforcement in this context, one in which individuals are sanctioned
more readily for deviating from norms.
120
Just as the examination of familial social norms has taken insufficient
account of emotion, scholars of emotion in family law have taken insufficient
account of social norms. An overview of the field of law and emotion reveals
this gap more fully.
The interplay between law and emotion is the subject of increasing
scholarly attention. The field of law and emotion has progressed from
tentative arguments that emotion has some value in legal reasoning to a
promising and still-maturing exploration of the relationship between emotion
and law.121 As Kathryn Abrams and Hila Keren have argued, law-and-emotion
scholarship holds the promise of illumination, investigation, and integration.
122
According to this characterization of the field, law-and-emotion scholarship
can illuminate the affective aspect of a given legal problem, investigate this
120 For one popular account of the stickiness of gender norms in the division of labor in marriage and the
social sanctions that accompany deviation from these norms, see Lisa Belkin, When Mom and Dad Share It
All, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2008, § MM (Magazine), at 44 (describing primarily heterosexual couples who
attempt to share parenting equally and the pushback many of these fathers have found in the workplace).
121 For an excellent review of the field, see Abrams & Keren, supra note 12, at 8-16. Law and emotion
differs from the field of law and psychology in that it draws upon the study of human emotion in a variety of
contexts, including feminism, anthropology, and philosophy. See Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A
Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 30 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 119, 121 (2006) ("Not only has law in
recent decades become far more receptive to insights from other disciplines, but those disciplines have begun
to engage far more deliberately with issues of defining and understanding human emotion."). The field of
psychology, of course, also concerns emotions, but law and psychology arguably is more narrowly focused.
See James R. P. Ogloff, Two Steps Forward and One Step Backward The Law and Psychology Movement(s)
in the 20th Century, in TAKING PSYCHOLOGY AND LAW INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1, 13 (James R. P.
Ogloff ed., 2006) (defining the law-and-psychology movement, under the label "legal psychology," as "the
scientific study of the effect of law on people; and the effect people have on the law" and noting that it "also
includes the application of the study and practice of psychology to legal institutions and people who come into
contact with the law").
122 Abrams & Keren, supra note 12, at 7-8. The field does not view emotion and emotional responses as
defective rationality, but rather as an acceptable mode of understanding and responding. See id. at 5.
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aspect-typically through interdisciplinary work 123-and integrate this
understanding into normative proposals for legal reform. 124
A handful of legal scholars have recently begun to explore the role of
emotion in family law.125  For example, I have argued that the substance,
procedure, and practice of family law do not account for the cyclical nature of
relationships, in which negative feelings are often followed by the desire to
repair the relationship. 126 Instead, in contexts as far ranging as divorce, child
welfare, and adoption, family law is predicated on a binary model of love and
hate, failing to account for guilt and the drive to reparation. This love-hate
model actively thwarts the cycle of intimacy, greatly diminishing the
opportunity for repair in familial relationships.
Similarly, Solangel Maldonado has examined the role of emotion in marital
dissolution proceedings and has contended that the law could do more to
cultivate forgiveness in divorcing spouses.127 Maldonado argues that scholars
should examine the role of emotion in family law because of an elevated
potential for harm. 128  Rather than focusing only on negative emotions, she
contends that the law can help cultivate forgiveness by eliminating all
consideration of marital fault in divorce proceedings and requiring parents in
high-conflict divorces to participate in a forgiveness education program. 129 As
is clear from these descriptions, these initial inquiries into the role of emotion
in family law have not yet addressed the role of social norms.
130
123 Although not yet fully developed, some methodological commitments of the field are beginning to
coalesce. For example, it is important for scholars to examine emotions from a variety of perspectives,
exploring how emotion is understood by neuroscientists, psychologists, economists, sociologists, philosophers,
political scientists, and anthropologists. See Peter H. Huang & Christopher J. Anderson, A Psychology of
Emotional Legal Decision Making: Revulsion and Saving Face in Legal Theory and Practice, 90 MINN. L.
REv. 1045, 1046-49 (2006) (reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME
AND THE LAW (2004)) (describing the need to address all these perspectives and others to fully understand the
role of emotion).
124 See Abrams & Keren, supra note 12, at 7-8.
125 See Laura E. Little, Negotiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 974, 980-81,
994 (2001) (reviewing THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999)) (noting the "[s]urprising" absence
of family law from law-and-emotion scholarship); Maroney, supra note 121, at 134 ("[L]ittle of the self-
identified law and emotion literature has entered the arena of family law, nor has the family-law literature
sought specifically to extract useful insights from the emotion-and-law field.").
126 See Huntington, Repairing Family Law, supra note 14, at 1274-93.
127 See Maldonado, supra note 14, at 441.
128 See id. at 450.
129 See id. at 461-69.
130 Maldonado's important exploration of the role of social norms in establishing economic fatherhood
was not a law-and-emotion inquiry, but as discussed in the text, she did touch upon guilt as a motivating force
for parents. See supra text accompanying notes 117-118.
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Taken together, the literature on social norms and emotion in family law
makes important inroads into our understanding of familial social norms, but
because this literature does not address the confluence of social norms,
emotion, and state influence, it presents an incomplete account of these norms.
The next Part begins this project.
II. ILLUSTRATING FAMILIAL SOCIAL NORMS
Emotion plays a key role in shaping and reinforcing most, if not all,
familial social norms. This Part explores this dynamic by examining three
sites of contention involving familial social norms: reproductive choice,
parenting, and same-sex relationships. In each of these contexts, emotion is
deeply relevant to, and yet largely unrecognized in current accounts of, social
norms. Exposing the role of emotion in familial social norms complicates, in a
constructive way, current understandings of decision making in families. It
also reveals the often unseen role the state plays in shaping familial social
norms.
This Part discusses specific norms, but it is important to note that social
norms regarding the family are both contested and changing. For example,
although the gendered division of parental responsibility has undergone
substantial changes in the last several decades, mothers still provide more child
care than fathers. 131  This trend is itself contested, with some communities
embracing a more traditional division of responsibility. 132  Despite this
variation, within any given community a norm can be remarkably salient, as a
non-breastfeeding mother in Park Slope, Brooklyn, or a gay couple holding
hands in Colorado Springs could readily attest.
133
131 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, AMERICAN TIME USE SURVEY-2008, tbl.9
(2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus.pdf (finding that between 2004 and 2008, on
average men spent .84 hours a day caring for children under age 18 while women spent 1.73 hours; even on
weekends and holidays, women spent more time than men caring for children: an average of 1.31 hours to .88
hours).
132 See, e.g., Focus on the Family, Parenting Roles, http://www.focusonthefamily.com/parenting/
parenting_roles.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) (prescribing different roles for mothers and fathers). Even in
this more traditional approach to parenting, however, fathers are still urged to be "involved." See, e.g., James
Dobson, The Involved Father, Focus ON TFIE FAMILY, http://www.focusonthefamily.com/parenting/parenting_
roles/the involved father.aspx (last visited May 12, 2010) (urging fathers to "give priority to your family").
133 Cf Steven Kurutz, A Park Slope Novel Seems a Little Too Real, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2009, at DI
(reviewing a new novel and referring to the setting, Park Slope, Brooklyn, where the stereotypical mother is
"militantly organic" and the local Tea Lounge has been dubbed, at least in the novel, as the "Teat Lounge").
[Vol. 59
HeinOnline  -- 59 Emory L.J. 1132 2009-2010
FAMILIAL NORMS AND NORMALITY
Another important caveat to the discussion that follows is that emotion
itself can be in part a social construction. For example, the idea that parents
love their children is both widespread and foundational in American society
(although perhaps a misplaced and misleading ideal, as addressed in Part III).
But this sentimentalization of children and parenting has not always been so
dominant. 134 The following discussion explores these points and more.
A. Three Examples
1. Abortion
Abortion is, of course, one of the most contentious issues in contemporary
American culture. In light of the roughly 846,000 abortions performed
annually, I35 as well as the ongoing political and social debate about the
practice, it is not possible to say there is one social norm concerning abortion.
It is possible, however, to discern the fault lines in the battle over abortion's
legality and its place in American life.
We have reached a legal equilibrium in which neither outer edge of the
abortion debate is likely to prevail-the Supreme Court likely will not
completely overturn Roe v. Wade, but neither will it limit in any serious way136
the swath of abortion-related regulation it now permits. As a result, abortion
law and politics have moved to a second-order debate, with a series of proxy
fights seeking to influence the decisions of women considering an abortion.
To this end, the pro-life movement is attempting to erect indirect barriers to
abortion. 137  These indirect barriers include legal efforts, such as the
requirement in some states that a woman view a sonogram of the fetus before
134 See infra note 182.
135 The Centers for Disease Control reported 846,181 abortions in 2006. See Karen Pazol et al., Ctrs. for
Disease Control & Prevention, Abortion Surveillance United States, 2006, MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WEEKLY REPORT, Nov. 27, 2009, at 4, available at http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/PDF/ss/ss5808.pdf
136 Compare Casey v. Planned Parenthood, 510 U.S. 1309 (1994) (failing to overturn Roe v. Wade), with
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (upholding restrictions on partial-birth abortions).
137 This is not to say that the pro-life movement has abandoned its effort to create direct barriers, such as
waiting periods and banning certain procedures. Indeed, the Partial Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-105, 117 Stat. 1201 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006)), is one such example. Moreover, some in
the pro-life movement oppose such incrementalism and seek an all-out ban. See Reva Siegel, The Right's
Reasons: Constitutional Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J.
1641, 1687-89 (2008) (describing these efforts).
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the abortion, 138 as well as extra-legal efforts, such as the claim by pro-life
advocates that women later regret abortions.
139
These indirect barriers can be understood as an attempt to shape an anti-
abortion social norm by changing the individual and cultural dimensions of the
emotions associated with abortion. The goal is to create a norm that
stigmatizes abortion. This is achieved by seeking to impose, cultivate, or
evoke the emotions of motherhood in all pregnant women. 14  The desired
norm is that women are mothers, and mothers love their children and would
never harm them. A woman who violates this norm thus feels guilty for
rejecting motherhood and, by extension, her womanhood.
In understanding the emotional effect of these indirect barriers, the work of
Carol Sanger is particularly helpful. Sanger has argued that statutes seemingly
unrelated to abortion, such as infant safe haven laws, play a particular role in
the "culture of life., 141 Safe haven laws allow a mother to leave her newborn
child anonymously in a designated spot such as a hospital or fire station
without fear of prosecution, thereby making the child a ward of the state and
effectively placing the child for adoption.142  The laws were passed in quick
succession in numerous states with virtually no opposition, partially in
138 See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 26-23A-1 to -13 (2009) (requiring ultrasounds before an abortion and
requiring that women be offered an opportunity to view the image); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-34 (2009)
(same). Three states require that a woman be able to see an ultrasound if one is done. See ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 20-16-602 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-9A-3, 19-8-5 (2009); MiCH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.17015 (West
2010). Two states require a woman to be told that she is entitled to an ultrasound at no additional cost. See
OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 1-738.2 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305 (West 2009). Another two states require a
woman to be told how to access ultrasound services. See IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1.1 (2009); WIS. STAT.
§ 253.10 (2009).
139 See Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection: Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart
117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1706-35 (2008) (tracing the roots of the women-protective antiabortion movement);
Emily Bazelon, Is There a Post-Abortion Syndrome?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 41
(describing these efforts). Extra-legal efforts are also apparent on pro-life websites and the materials the
websites distribute. See, e.g., HopeAfterAbortion.com, Understanding Abortion's Aftermath, http://www.
hopeafterabortion.com/hope.cfm?sel=aftermath (last visited Apr. 6, 2010) ("[F]or many, the experience [of
having an abortion] is devastating, causing severe and long-lasting emotional, psychological and spiritual
trauma."); NAT'L RiGHT To LIFE EDUC. TRUST FUND, ABORTION's PSYCHO-SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES (2006),
available at http://www.nrlc.org/Factsheets/FS18 AbtnPsychoSocial.pdf ("[P]olls and studies indicate many
women end up regretting th[e] decision [to have an abortion] in the weeks, months, or years that follow.").
140 See KRISTiN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 192-215 (1984) (describing the
role of the motherhood norm in abortion debates).
141 See Carol Sanger, Infant Safe Haven Laws: Legislating in the Culture of Life, 106 COLUM. L. REv.
753, 753 (2006).
142 See id. at 753, 756. The laws of a few states also allow other specified individuals to leave the child
with the mother's permission. See id. at 765.
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response to high profile cases of young women killing or abandoning their
newborns.
143
These laws may be facially unobjectionable, but their deeper meaning
relates to pro-life social norm entrepreneurship because such laws seek to
change the emotional resonance of the abortion decision. The thought of a
newborn in a dumpster is horrific, and it is precisely this image that the safe
haven laws seek to imprint on citizens and on individual women considering
an abortion. The horror and revulsion at the thought of a woman who would
throw out her child can be superimposed on a woman who would "throw out"
her child a different way-by having an abortion.
144
Similarly, Sanger has discussed laws that require a woman who has chosen
to have an abortion to first view an ultrasound of the fetus (or sign a waiver
declining to view the ultrasound). 145  As Sanger argues, ultrasounds have
emotional content. In addition to requiring a woman to sign an informed
consent waiver stating that she understands the procedure will end the
existence of the fetus, the woman also is required to absorb this information
pictorially. The state chooses this method because it effectively conveys the
state's preferred narrative. 146 Mandatory sonogram laws thus seek not only to
alter the emotional calculus of individuals facing abortion decisions, but also to
reinforce larger social messages about reproductive choices.
Infant safe haven and mandatory sonogram laws may have little practical
effect on a woman's decision to have an abortion. The idea that a woman
would not have an abortion because she knows she can keep her pregnancy
secret, give birth in private, and then drop off the newborn at a designated spot
is highly implausible. 147  Similarly, the woman who is required to view a
sonogram of her fetus has already decided to have the abortion.
148
To be sure, some women may choose not to abort a fetus as a result of
these laws, but the more pervasive effect of these laws (and others that send
similar signals)149 is subtle and far-reaching. The laws contribute to the
143 See id. at 753-54.
144 See id at 760, 809.
145 See Sanger, supra note 9, at 351, 377.
146 See id. at351.
147 See Sanger, supra note 141, at 753.
148 See supra note 9, at 362, 381.
149 Some states have enacted laws designed to inform women that fetuses of twenty or more weeks can
experience pain. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1103 (2005) (requiring the provider to inform a patient
that information regarding the "unborn child['s]" pain is available in printed form and via a state-sponsored
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creation of a social norm that a fetus is a human being, that pregnant women
are mothers who must conform to maternal norms, and that having an abortion
is a shameful act. Without this emotional component, these laws would not be
nearly as effective in contributing to a social norm that stigmatizes the choice
to have an abortion. This is not to say that the decision to have an abortion is
without emotional resonance and that the state is somehow adding emotion to
the decision. Rather, the point is that the state is privileging and emphasizing
one set of emotions over another. In this way, the state is manipulating the
emotional context of decision making.
Turning to extra-legal efforts to create a social norm that views abortions in
only one way-as a shameful act that no loving person would undertake-the
pro-life movement is waging a campaign attempting to persuade women that
they will feel regret if they abort a fetus. 150  Rather than directly demonize a
pregnant woman considering an abortion, this strategy is more subtle. It sends
a message of compassion for the pregnant woman: "We care about you so
much that we want to stop you from doing something you will later regret."
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Gonzales v. Carhart151 provides some
evidence that this particular anti-choice social norm is gaining ground. It also
shows how the state, acting through the judiciary, can reinforce certain social
messages. In that opinion, the majority stated that "[w]hether to have an
abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no
reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to
conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they
once created and sustained." '152 That the Court could make this assertion
website); id. § 20-16-1104 (providing that the physician must inform a patient whether an analgesic or
anesthetic would lessen or eliminate the "unborn child['s]" pain caused by the abortion); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-
9A-4 (Supp. 2005) (providing that information on pain potentially experienced by an "unborn child" shall be
available via printed materials and via the state's website).
150 Pro-life websites, for example, direct readers to testimonials by women who regret having had an
abortion. See, e.g., Lovematters.com, Women Who've Had Abortions, http://www.lovematters.com/women.
htm (last visited Feb 5, 2010) ("Sonya had an abortion and advises other women, 'Don't do it. Regret of a
permanent decision is like watching a sad movie over and over again and hoping the ending will change-but
it never will."'). Perhaps most famous is the amicus brief submitted to the Supreme Court in Gonzales v.
Carhart making this claim. See infra note 152.
151 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
152 Id. at 159 (citing Brief for Sandra Cano et al. the Former "Mary Doe" of Doe v. Bolton, and 180
Women Injured by Abortion as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 550 U.S. 124 (May 22, 2006) (No. 05-
380), 2006 WL 1436684).
[Vol. 59
HeinOnline  -- 59 Emory L.J. 1136 2009-2010
FAMILIAL NORMS AND NORMALITY
without support is some indication that the abortion-as-regret narrative has
become a familiar one.
153
Teen pregnancy websites echo this message. For example, the home page
of TeenBreaks.com does not at first glance appear to be a pro-life website. But
the testimonials are one-sided, with girls and young women explaining in
emotional terms why they chose not to seek an abortion. 154 For those who did
have an abortion, there are long narratives about the emotional aftermath.
155
Similar to the indirect legal barriers, these extra-legal efforts contribute to
an anti-abortion social norm, which resonates because it is created by and
builds upon powerful emotions-fetuses as humans and, thus, deserving of
protection; women as mothers, regardless of their desire to be so; and abortion
as a shameful and regret-inducing act. Although it is not yet clear whether
women and girls are in fact influenced by an anti-abortion social norm,
153 Cf Chris Guthrie, Carhart, Constitutional Rights, and the Psychology of Regret, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
877, 881-82 (2008) (arguing that the majority opinion in Carhart misunderstands regret as an emotion because
the opinion assumes that women should be protected from regret because they are unable to anticipate it; in
reality, individuals (1) are regret averse and factor the risk of regret into decision making, (2) overestimate
anticipated regret, so when they actually experience it they find that it is less severe and more fleeting than
expected, (3) are able to dampen any regret they do experience, and (4) learn from regret and thus tend to
make better decisions in the future); Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Common Sense as Constitutional Law, 62
VAND. L. REv. 851, 891 (2009) ("The Carhart majority, by thus eliding relevant categories, is subtly signaling
endorsement of an account of the world in which abortion properly is regarded as the killing of a child by its
mother, and the emotional consequences of the former therefore will match those of the latter. This half-
submerged judgment is further discernable in the Court's discussion of post-abortion regret. . . . [T]he
invocation of such regret sends an important signal of the Court's evaluation of how post-abortive women
should feel, which colors how it presents what they do feel-which then in turn influences the constitutional
judgment.").
154 See, e.g., Teenbreaks.com, Teen Abortion Issues, Teen Stands Up and Walks Out on Her Abortion,
http://teenabortionissues.com/?s=but+on+the+table+waiting+for+the+doctor+to+come+in/o2C+I+told+him+I
+was+not+able+to+do+this.&x=33&y=13 (last May 23, 2010) ("When I got to the clinic I was ready to have
[the abortion], but on the table waiting for the doctor to come in, I told him I was not able to do this. I could
not hurt an innocent life who had nothing to do with decisions I made. At that very moment I walked out,
looked at my mom, and said she could hate me if she wanted but I was keeping my child. My parents were not
supportive about the decision and for not doing what I was supposed to do. My now ex boyfriend was there
for nine months and then left me after my son was born. I absolutely love my son Nathan, and I am very
happy I made the decision I did.").
155 See, e.g., Teenbreaks.com, Teen Aborted Because It Was Too Soon, http://teenabortionissues.com/?s=
I+feel+guilty+and+ashamed+of+the+thought+that+I+killed+&x= 3 8 &y=2 (last visited May 23, 2010) ("Now I
feel guilty and ashamed of the thought that I killed an innocent life because my family believed the time was
not right. Everyday I cry thinking about my baby. I just want to tell anyone who is thinking of an abortion,
please, please make sure it is the right thing to do because there is no turning back after you wake up from
surgery."). Even the page "about abortion" begins with a photograph of the feet of an aborted fetus held
between an adult's fingers. See Teenbreaks.com, What Is Abortion?, http://www.teenbreaks.com
/abortion/whatisabortion.cfm (last visited Feb. 21, 2010).
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contributing to their choice not to abort a fetus, 156 abortion does appear to be
stigmatized. To give just one example, although numerous publically elected
officials are openly gay (albeit mostly at lower levels of government or in the
U.S. House of Representatives), it is difficult to identify a public official who
is open about having had an abortion or paid for someone else to have one.157
Even accounting for the personal nature of the decision, we might expect at
least some pro-choice public officials to use a personal narrative to support
their stance if abortion were understood as a more neutral event.
The state's favored narrative is not preordained, and other narratives are
possible. For example, rather than focusing on regret, shame, and guilt, there
could be a similar narrative about the relief and satisfaction experienced by a
woman who has made a choice about her life and acted upon that choice.
158
Recent abortion rate statistics for various demographic groups show that the
proportion of women having an abortion who already have one child has been
increasing, while abortion rates for other demographic groups, notably
teenagers and women in their early twenties, have declined. 159  Arguably,
women who already have at least one child are the most informed about the
156 Declining abortion rates-both among married and unmarried women and women of all races, but
especially among white, African-American, and Latino women between the ages of fifteen and twenty four-
may be some indication that the social norm is taking hold. Stephanie J. Ventura et al., Estimated Pregnancy
Rates by Outcome for the United States, 1990-2004, NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP, April 14, 2008, at 6, 13-17, 22,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr56/nvsr56_ 15.pdf Without a systematic survey of those
who choose abortions and those who do not, it is impossible to identify the precise motivations.
157 When abortion does surface, it can spell political trouble, especially for conservative candidates. For
example, in a May 2008 congressional primary race in Oregon, support for the leading Republican candidate
Mike Erickson dropped dramatically when his opponent alleged that Erickson had paid for a former girlfriend
to have an abortion. Erickson, who had been leading in the polls by ten percentage points prior to the
allegation, won the nomination by fewer than 1,300 votes, but he lost important endorsements from the
Republican U.S. Senator Gordon Smith and an influential anti-abortion group, Oregon Right to Life. Erickson
also was labeled unelectable and was encouraged to resign the nomination by a leading Oregon newspaper.
See Editorial, The Oregon GOP's 5th District Dilemma, OREGONIAN, May 25, 2008, at D4 ("More recent
integrity issues also cloud Erickson's candidacy. They make him appear almost unelectable at this point in his
general election contest .. "); Steve Mayes, Erickson Beats Mannix in Contest Turned Nasty, OREGONIAN,
May 21, 2008, at A6 ("Erickson defeated Mannix in a race that ended with allegations of dishonesty and
hypocrisy over Erickson's anti-abortion position that were disclosed just nine days before ballots were due.").
158 Cf Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv. 261, 351-80 (1992) (arguing that we should locate the
constitutional protection of abortions in equal protection as well as privacy because abortion regulations,
analyzed in a social rather than physiological framework, can be understood as a form of sex discrimination
based on traditional assumptions about proper gender roles).
159 See STANLEY K. HENSHAW & KATHRYN KoST, GUTTMACHER INST., TRENDS IN THE CHARACTERISTICS
OF WOMEN OBTAINING ABORTIONS, 1974 TO 2004, at 10-15 (2008), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/
pubs/2008/09/23/TrendsWomenAbortions-wTables.pdf.
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decision because they know what it takes to bear and raise a child."' It is not
difficult to imagine a counter narrative built around this trend, portraying a
woman who has chosen to have an abortion as feeling a sense of equanimity
because she has decided to save her emotional and financial resources for her
existing family. This is not to imply that women who have abortions for other
reasons are somehow less worthy and their decisions less deserving of
deference. Rather, the point is simply that within the pro-life framework of
emotions and abortion, it is possible to tell a positive story that also fits with
the iconic image of the loving, self-sacrificing mother.
There are other possible narratives as well, albeit more in line with pro-
choice values. In the words of a retired gynecologist who used to treat women
after botched illegal abortions in the pre-Roe days:
It is important to remember that Roe v. Wade did not mean that
abortions could be performed. They have always been done, dating
from ancient Greek days. What Roe said was that ending a
pregnancy could be carried out by medical personnel, in a medically
accepted setting, thus conferring on women, finally, the full rights of
first-class citizens-and freeing their doctors to treat them as such.
16 1
The powerful emotional appeal of this statement reinforces a different norm
around abortion, one that safeguards the well-being of women wholly apart
from their role as potential mothers.
2. Parenting
Emotion likewise plays a central role in creating and perpetuating social
norms in parenting. 162 The legal principle of family autonomy largely shields
intact families from direct legal intervention disrupting parental choices. To be
sure, with compulsory education rules and the prohibition against child labor
160 See id. at 14-15 ("Because they already have children, a majority of women having abortions are
aware of the implications of assuming responsibility for an additional child.").
161 Waldo L. Fielding, Op-Ed., Repairing the Damage, Before Roe, N.Y. TIMEs, June 3, 2008, at Fl.
162 Indeed, the decision to have children at all also involves social norms. Katherine Franke and Mary
Anne Case argue that feminists should challenge the connection between women, caretaking, and motherhood
and instead focus on other paths for women. See Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling
Questions About Where, Why, and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1753, 1753-57 (2001); Katherine M. Franke, Theorizing Yes: An Essay on Feminism, Law, and Desire,
101 COLUM. L. REv. 181, 197 (2001).
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(to name just two limitations on parenting decisions), 163 parental autonomy is
not absolute. Moreover, with the advent of child protection laws, there are
some minimum standards for parenting-parents who fail to provide adequate
care for their children risk involvement with the child welfare system.
164
165But as a basic proposition, at least for families in the dominant group, the
state generally leaves parents alone unless they make gross parenting errors.
This deference is based upon a number of principles: that parents generally
will act in the best interests of their children,166 that this deference is a
necessary quid pro quo to induce parents to undertake the hard work of
parenting, 167 and that parents enjoy a relative competency with respect to
assessing and meeting the needs of their children. 168  In short, parenting
provides a classic example of an important social institution that the law
regulates only on the margins.
169
Presenting a mirror image to this minimal legal regulation, an extensive set
of social norms governs parenting behavior. As any parent can attest, norms of
proper parenting abound. These norms vary with the community--defined
along numerous axes, including socio-economic status, geography, and
religion-and change over time.170  The social norms surrounding myriad
163 See, e.g., CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 48200,48293,48400 (West 2006 & Supp. 2010) (requiring compulsory
full-time education for children between ages six and eighteen); CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 1290-1294.3 (West 2003
& Supp. 2010) (prohibiting employment of minors under the age of sixteen except as otherwise stipulated).
164 Child abuse and neglect are bases for removing a child from the home of the parent. See, e.g., GA.
CODE ANN. § 19-7-5 (2009); MINN. STAT. § 626.556 (2009); N.J. STAT ANN. § 30:4C-1(a), (f) (West 2008).
165 For a discussion of why African-American families are more likely to be investigated for child abuse
and neglect, see DOROTHY ROBERTS, SHATTERED BONDS: THE COLOR OF CUILD WELFARE 47-48 (2002).
166 See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68-69 (2000) ("[S]o long as a parent adequately cares for his or
her children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of
the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that
parent's children.").
167 See Scott & Scott, supra note 109, at 2440 ("[P]arental authority over the relationship with children is
offered as the quid pro quo for satisfactory [parental] performance. It is unlikely that, in a hypothetical bargain
over the terms of their performance, parents would agree to undertake the responsibilities desired by the state
without assurance that their investment would receive legal protection.").
168 See Emily Buss, Allocating Developmental Control Among Parent, Child and the State, 2004 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 27, 33-34 (arguing that "relative competencies" should guide the allocation of developmental
control between parent and state, giving parents greater control over matters with only private effects, and the
state control over matters "in which the state has a direct stake," such as education, which affects an
individual's ability to participate in and contribute to "a healthy democracy and economy").
169 As discussed infra, the state does indirectly influence parenting by influencing social norms. See text
accompanying note 186.
170 Corporal punishment, for example, was once widely understood as an effective means of disciplining a
child. See BENJAMIN SPOCK, DR. SPOCK TALKS WITH MOTHERS: GROWTH AND GuIDANcE 102-04 (1961)
(describing various forms of punishment, noting that "I think it's of relatively minor importance whether you
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specific parenting choices are far-reaching, creating expectations that parents
will, depending on the community, baptize or circumcise a child (or follow a
similar religious ritual for a young child), dress a child in gender-specific
clothing, teach a child not to use swear words (at least in public), volunteer in a
child's school, value homework, or provide a religious education. Fellow
family members, teachers, religious-community members, neighbors, and
171
others enforce these expectations on a regular basis.
The disapproval of an individual's parenting choices is both conveyed and
felt in emotional terms. The parent who does not comply with context-specific
social norms is understood to feel something less than complete love and care
for her child. Thus, the implicit message in a relative asking why a toddler is
not in bed at 10 p.m. is that a "good parent" would have the child in bed. 1 2 In
this way, social norms operate as subtle shaming of parents, in the name of a
child's well-being.
Related decisions-such as the division of family responsibility along
gender lines (for opposite-sex parents) and the amount of time dedicated to the
family as opposed to the remunerative workplace-are also infused with
emotional content. The battles over the proper balance for women between
career and family arguably have become fraught precisely because these
questions go to the heart of a person's identity, at least in those socio-economic
communities where working is a choice. One person's choice is understood
either to validate or invalidate another person's choice. The judgmental aspect
spank him or send him to his room or just glare at him," and further noting that "[a] slap on the hand or behind
works like a charm for" some parents and children). Today the practice is largely frowned upon by experts.
See BENJAMIN SPOCK & STEVEN PARKER, DR. SPOCK'S BABY AND CHILD CARE 428 (8th ed. 2004) ("[M]ost
American parents believe in spanking. Most experts disagree."). For a discussion of the historically
contingent nature of parenting advice, see generally ANN HULBERT, RAISING AMERICA: EXPERTS, PARENTS,
AND A CENTURY OF ADVICE ABOUT CHILDREN 360-70 (2003).
171 Although family autonomy runs deep as a legal matter, non-legal actors often feel no such
compunction to withhold judgment. Indeed, ask any parent for a story of a complete stranger weighing in on
some manner of parenting (for example, a stranger telling a pregnant woman in the check-out line that she
should not be buying junk food, or telling a parent in the park that a child's helmet is not on properly).
Children can be norm enforcers too, such as when they tell a parent what is acceptable to wear at school or
when they respond to advertising that targets them, thus enforcing certain consumerist norms. In this way,
peer pressure can be understood as another means of norm transmission.
172 In another community, requiring a child to go to bed and miss a family gathering might be seen as the
violation of a social norm. "Why put Mary to bed at 10 p.m. and keep her from the family? A good parent
would...."
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of these competing norms (for example, to work outside the home or not)
contributes to their salience.
173
To say that emotion is the currency that enforces parenting social norms is
only to start the analysis. The motivation to comply with parenting social
norms is complex. To begin, most parents are intrinsically motivated to care
for their children. Various theories for this motivation abound, particularly
sociobiological, 174 biological, 175 and psychoanalytic 176 explanations. 177 These
theories have generated controversy in some particulars, but it is not necessary
to weigh the relative merits of each explanation to note the unifying theme of
intrinsic motivation.
Even though intrinsic motivation to care for a child exists, there is no
universal understanding of how a parent should care for a child. Instead, what
it means to care for a child is supplied by social norms. For example, there is
no law of nature that says a parent must put an infant in a separate bed at night
173 Steven Nock has argued that there is no social norm concerning women in the workplace. He says that
although it is "typical" now for women to work, this does not make it normative with an accompanying social
sanction for women who do not work outside the home. See Nock, supra note 58, at 1975-76. By contrast, he
contends that work is normative for men. See id at 1975. Whether there is a social norm encouraging women
to work or stay home is highly community-specific. Thus, data revealing the national average for workforce
participation by mothers tells us little about a woman's experience in various communities. For example, in
some communities a woman may be regarded critically if she returns to work when her child is very young,
while in other communities a woman staying home after her children start school may be regarded with similar
disdain. At the very least, there is tremendous acrimony surrounding the "mommy wars." See, e.g., MIRIAM
PESKOWITZ, THE TRUTH BEHIND THE MOMMY WARS: WHO DECIDES WHAT MAKES A GOOD MOTHER? (2005);
MOMMY WARS: STAY-AT-HOME AND CAREER MOMS FACE OFF ON THEIR CHOICES, THEIR LIvES, THEIR
FAMILIES (Leslie Morgan Steiner ed., 2006).
174 See, e.g., SHELLY E. TAYLOR, THE TENDING INSTINCT: How NURTURING IS ESSENTIAL TO WHO WE
ARE AND HOW WE LIVE 12 (2002) (describing the "tending instinct" as "a fundamental truth about human
nature: The brain and body are crafted to tend ... in order to attract, maintain, and nurture relationships with
others across the life span"); see also ANTONIO DAMASIO, LOOKING FOR SPINOZA: JOY, SORROW, AND THE
FEELING BRAIN 140-51 (2003) (describing the role of various regions of the brain in forming and sustaining
attachments).
175 See, e.g., LOUIS J. COZOLINO, THE NEUROSCIENCE OF PSYCHOTHERAPY: BUILDING AND REBUILDING
THE HuMAN BRAIN 176-77, 210-11 (2002) (explaining the neurochemistry underlying mother-child
attachment); C. Sue Carter, Neuroendocrine Perspectives on Social Attachment and Love, 23
PSYCHONEUROENDOCLUNOLOGY 779, 788 (1998) (describing the role of oxytocin in pair-bonding).
176 See HANNA SEGAL, INTRODUCTION TO THE WORK OF MELANIE KLEIN 79 (1964) ("It is the wish and
the capacity for the restoration of the good object, internal and external, that is the basis of the ego's capacity
to maintain love and relationships through conflicts and difficulties.").
177 The altruistic vision of parents' love for their children is at least as old as Aristotle, who said that a
mother's love for her child is "defined as one who wishes and does what is good, or what seems to be good, to
another for the other's sake." THE NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE bk. IX, ch. iv (J. E. C. Welldon
trans., 1892). The quoted material actually refers to friendship, but Aristotle then says "[t]his is the feeling of
mothers toward their children." Id.
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or, conversely, must have the infant sleep next to the parent. But social norms
send strong signals to a parent about the "right" thing to do. 17 8  The parent
complies with this social norm at least partly out of intrinsic motivation to care
for her child. In this way, intrinsic motivation acts as an enforcement
mechanism. In other words, parenting social norms give context-specific
meaning to what it is to "care" for a child. In one community, that may be
hovering over children at every moment to ensure their safety; in another
community that may be giving children far greater latitude to make their own
mistakes and learn from them.
Although the intrinsic motivation to care for a child may not vary over
time, social norms do. For example, in the 1920s and 1930s, mothers were
discouraged from picking up crying infants and from playing with and rocking
them.179 Experts feared this would inculcate bad habits, breed self indulgence,
and make the child dependent on attention.180  Today, attachment theories
abound, and parents are encouraged to hold their children as much as
possible.18 1 It is not that parents in the early part of the twentieth century were
any less intrinsically motivated to care for their children. Rather, what it
means to care for a child has changed over time.
182
178 For example, in many countries, including India, China, Kenya, Liberia, Mexico, Guatemala, and
Japan, infants almost always sleep with their mothers. See HEIDi KELLER, CULTURES OF INFANCY 173-74
(2007) (describing sleeping arrangements for children in Beijing, China; San Jose, Costa Rica; and Delhi,
India); MnREniTH F. SMALL, OUR BABIES, OURSELVES: How BiOLOGY AND CULTURE SHAPE THE WAY WE
PARENT 112-13 (1998) (comparing sleeping arrangements of American babies and Mayan babies in
Guatemala); BEATRICE BLYTH WHITING & CAROLYN POPE EDWARDS, CHILDREN OF DIFFERENT WORLDS 19,
42 (1988) (observing sleeping arrangements for children in Kenya, India, Liberia, Mexico, and the Philippines
and noting that "infants in our samples customarily sleep in the same bed with their mothers until they are
weaned"). By contrast, even with the rise of the "co-sleeping" movement in the United States, see SEARS ET
AL., supra note 8, at 8-9 (recommending co-sleeping--"sharing sleep"-with infants), infants typically sleep
apart from their mothers even if they are in the same room. See JUDY DELOACHE & ALMA GOTTLIEB, A
WORLD OF BABIEs: IMAGINED CHILDCARE GuiDES FOR SEVEN SOCiETiES 16-17 (2000) (reporting that solitary
sleeping is by far the most common practice among middle-class European-American families but that among
some groups in the United States "identified by ethnic identity and/or class," co-sleeping is common and may
be the majority practice).
179 CHILDREN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU PuB. No. 8, INFANT CARE 41, 52 (1932).
180 See, e.g., ELIZABETH M. SLOAN CHESSER, CHILD HEALTH AND CHARACTER 30-31 (1927);
CILDREN's BUREAU, supra note 179, at 52. Instead, experts instructed that "a few minutes before feeding, [a
child] should be taken up and held quietly in his mother's arms, in a variety of positions, so that no one set of
muscles may become overtired." Id.
181 See, e.g., SEARS ET AL., supra note 8, at 281-83, 301-11 (advocating "babywearing" as beneficial to
both mother and infant by promoting attachment and "harmony," enhancing learning and cognitive
development, and reducing crying and colic). See generally WLLAM SEARS, THE ATTACHMENT PARENTING
BOOK (2001).
182 Further, one of the most far-reaching changes has been the sentimentalization of children, viewing
them as cherished indulgences rather than extra pairs of hands essential in an agrarian society. See VrVIANA A.
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In addition to the intrinsic motivation to comply with social norms (because
the norms tell parents what loving parents do), there is also extrinsic
motivation for parents to comply with social norms.18 3  As discussed more
fully below, 184 rational-choice accounts of why people comply with social
norms are relevant to this point: A parent follows the social norm in her
community because she does not want to lose the esteem of others. It is the
complex interaction between intrinsic-and deeply emotional-motivations
and these extrinsic forces that shapes the power and resonance of parenting
social norms.
185
Returning to the confluence of social norms, emotion, and the state:
although the state may not directly regulate parenting, it does shape parenting
norms in a variety of ways. To use the example of the gender norms
surrounding paid work and parenting, by enacting and enforcing workplace
discrimination laws, the state sends the message that women belong in the
workplace as much as men. And by making family leave available to both
parents, the state sends a message that men play an important role in caring for
dependents. Political leaders often invoke emotion in supporting these laws.
For example, in his signing statement accompanying the Family and Medical
Leave Act, President Clinton said "American workers will no longer have to
ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 1, 5-12 (1985)
(describing "the social construction of the economically 'worthless' but emotionally 'priceless' child in the
United States from 1870 to 1930," arguing that this "has created an essential condition of contemporary
childhood," and further contending that the change is largely due to the end of child labor).
183 Falling in between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation is the parent who doubts her emotions. See supra
text accompanying note 90. For such an individual, it can be comforting to follow social norms. For example,
if a new mother suffers from post-partum depression and does not readily feel love for her child, she can
comfort herself by following the community-specific breastfeeding norm. Thus, she reasons, "I must love my
child because I am doing what other new mothers do."
184 See infra Part II.C.
185 Illustrating another example of the contested norms around parenting, the Supreme Court has drawn a
distinction between biological parents and foster parents on the ground that foster parents are paid for
parenting and thus are not necessarily entitled to the same constitutional protections as biological parents. See
Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 845 (1977) ("[T]here are also important
distinctions between the foster family and the natural family. First, unlike the earlier cases recognizing a right
to family privacy, the State here seeks to interfere, not with a relationship having its origins entirely apart from
the power of the State, but rather with a foster family which has its source in state law and contractual
arrangements."). If the social norm surrounding parenting hinges on intrinsic motivation (the idea that parents
will, purely by dint of being parents, care for their children), a very different norm accompanies the status of
foster parents. The norm for foster parents is one of induced care and an absence of intrinsic motivation.
Payments distinguish foster parents from "real" parents. The Court thus sent an unintended signal about
parenting as an endeavor disconnected from extrinsic, pecuniary motivation.
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choose between the job they need and the family they love." 186 The message is
that these are not lazy workers looking for "time off," but rather dedicated
family members seeking to care for their loved ones, a responsibility that falls
on all of us.
3. Same-Sex Relationships
A third site of familial social norms-the norms attending family
formation-equally illustrates the central role of emotion as well as state
influence on family norms. Perhaps no area of family law is more contested
than the status of same-sex couples. A generation ago, a lack of legal
recognition was accompanied by strong social sanctions against such couples.
Today, social norms have changed in some, but by no means all,
communities. 187  One way to understand the intense battles currently raging
over legal recognition of alternative family forms is by understanding that one
community's social norms may be perceived as threatening to another. And
the social norms themselves-whether a community is more or less accepting
of same-sex couples-turn on the community's emotional response to such
couples.
As with abortion and parenting, emotion is a critical feature of the social
norms surrounding same-sex couples.188 As discussed above, 189 advocates on
both sides of the debate over same-sex marriage employ emotion to reinforce
existing social norms. Those opposed to same-sex marriage tap into feelings
186 William J. Clinton, Statement on Signing the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=46777 (last visited May 13, 2010).
187 Although challenging to prove empirically, some evidence to support this claim is found in the various
state and local laws, as well as court opinions, recognizing rights of same-sex couples. See, e.g., Kerrigan v.
Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008) (recognizing a right to same-sex marriage under the state
constitution); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (same); see also CAL. FAM.
CODE § 297 (West 2004 & Supp. 2010) (listing requirements for establishing a domestic partnership); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:1-a (2010) ("Any person who otherwise meets the eligibility requirements of this
chapter may marry any other eligible person regardless of gender."); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:8A (West 2009)
(formally recognizing domestic partnerships); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1202 (2007) (listing requirements for a
valid civil union). By contrast, in other communities, there is still a strong social norm against same-sex
couples. Again, although empirical evidence may be hard to come by, the state laws and recent constitutional
amendments limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples and, in some states, prohibiting civil unions, are clear
evidence that there is no consistent social norm recognizing same-sex couples across the United States. See,
e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 31 ("Only a union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a
marriage in this state."); MICH. CONST. art. I, § 25 (similar); OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a (similar); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 741.212 (West 2005) (similar).
188 Although the point is not elaborated here, religious views, which can have a strong emotional
component, provide part of the fuel for opposition to same-sex marriage.
189 See supra Part I.B.2.
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of disgust. Those in favor of same-sex marriage attempt to evoke more
positive feelings by portraying same-sex couples as emotionally akin to
opposite-sex couples-loving and caring.
Importantly, social norms of acceptance tend to precede legal recognition,
and when this does not occur, the emotional resonance of legal change can
backfire on advocates. For example, some states where courts have recognized
legal rights for same-sex couples, such as Connecticut, 190 Massachusetts, 191
and Vermont, 192 are commonly understood to be states where same-sex
couples were welcome before the legal decisions. 93  This can play out
differently around the country depending in part on access to ballot initiatives.
For example, although parts of California are famously liberal and the state
supreme court found a right to marry someone of the same sex in the state's
constitution, 194 a majority of voters chose to amend the state constitution tolimit marriage to opposite-sex couples. 1 95
As with abortion and parenting social norms, the state can help cultivate a
social norm of tolerance or intolerance through means other than judicial
proceedings. For example, San Francisco has been known as a gay-friendly
city for decades. In 2004, when Mayor Newsom proactively championed
same-sex marriage (as opposed to domestic partnership, which was supported
by California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger) and framed his support as an
emotional argument favoring dignity and equality, this contributed to San
Francisco's social norm of tolerance and provided further support for same-sex
marriage (though it also provoked serious backlash). 196  Of course, it is
190 Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 407.
191 Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 941.
192 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
193 Claims for legal recognition of same-sex couples do not always prevail in states generally considered
liberal. For example, the high court in New York rejected a claim to same-sex marriage. See Hernandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). However, a lower court later found that same-sex marriages from other
jurisdictions should be lawfully recognized in New York. See Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d
740 (App. Div. 2008). In response, Governor David Paterson issued a directive ordering state agencies to
recognize same-sex marriages legally contracted outside the state. See Memorandum from David Nocenti to
All Agency Counsel (May 14, 2008), available at http://www.ny.gov/governor/reports/pdf/Nocenti memo.
pdf This compromise may reflect the divided political character of New York State, with a liberal south and
more conservative north.
194 See In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 419-34 (Cal. 2008).
195 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5 (2008) (recognizing marriage as between a man and a woman). Considerable
dispute has arisen over how to interpret the success of the Proposition 8 ballot initiative. See, e.g., Hendrik
Hertzberg, Eight Is Enough, NEW YORKER, Dec. 1, 2008, at 27.
196 See Bob Egelko, Top State Court Voids S.F. 's Gay Marriages: A Mayor Overruled; Newsom Found to
Violate California Law by Issuing Same-Sex Licenses, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 13, 2004, at Al (quoting Mayor
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challenging to disentangle the precise interplay between norms and state
action. The relationship between the social norm of tolerance and protective
laws is complex, with one surely influencing the other.197  But to the extent
laws gently reinforce what may be a growing norm of tolerance, the state will
likely help expand and strengthen that norm. 198  Conversely, laws that fail to
recognize same-sex relationships as equal to opposite-sex relationships, such
as the Defense of Marriage Act,199 contribute to a norm of intolerance by
signaling the state's view that same-sex relationships are less deserving of state
protection and therefore somehow less acceptable.
B. Synthesizing the Many Roles of Emotion
To enunciate and systematize the relationship between emotion and
familial social norms, this section draws out four main insights from the three
examples discussed above. First, emotion is often the content of a familial
social norm; thus it is impossible to understand norms without understanding
emotion. Second, emotion can instigate a norm. By cultivating certain
emotions, it is possible to shape behavior. Third, familial social norms carry
tremendous emotional weight, which explains why the cost of noncompliance
can be particularly high in the family context. Finally, the emotion-laden
nature of familial social norms complicates any predictive enterprise.
Newsom as saying, "[i]t is wrong to deny tens of millions of Americans the same rights and privileges that
people like myself ... have been afforded just through happenstance because we married somebody of a
different gender" (alteration in original)).
197 Lessons from the Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School are relevant to any understanding of
norm formulation and modification and how these processes are affected by currently held values. According
to the Project, "[c]ultural cognition refers to the tendency of individuals to conform their beliefs about disputed
matters of fact (e.g., whether global warming is a serious threat; whether the death penalty deters murder;
whether gun control makes society more safe or less) to values that define their cultural identities." Cultural
Cognition Project Home Page, http://www.culturalcognition.net (last visited Mar. 26, 2010). Stated more
concretely, the Cultural Cognition Project tells us that social norms may be sticky because of the deeply held
values underlying them. Telling someone opposed to same-sex marriage that children raised by same-sex
parents have outcomes similar to children raised by opposite-sex parents will not necessarily lead to a change
in values and hence a change in the corresponding social norm (the rejection of same-sex couples). Thus, any
inquiry into social norms, especially social norms related to the contested issues surrounding families, must
account for this stickiness. A full account of the role of cultural cognition, however, is beyond the scope of
this Article.
198 See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem, 67 U. CIu. L.
REv. 607, 625-32 (2000) (arguing that sudden changes to the law can be "hard shoves" to social norms that
lead to backlash and resistance, such as the 1920s prohibition on alcohol, but incremental changes to the law,
such as limited smoking bans, can serve as "gentle nudges" to social norms that lead to widespread compliance
and a change in perceptions about acceptable behavior).
199 Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 1
U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
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Emotion as the content of a norm. Emotion is often an embedded feature
of a norm. For example, the norm that all parents love their children would not
exist but for emotion. Thus, it is not possible to understand the norm without
grasping the emotional aspect of the norm. If we better understand the relevant
emotion, we better understand the norm.
Emotion as the instigator of a norm. Emotion also can trigger a norm when
particular emotions induce a change in behavior. For example, when Colorado
sought to reduce the incidence of shaken-baby syndrome, the state drew upon
both fear and compassion to trigger a non-shaking norm. 20 The state evoked
fear by educating new parents about the real and devastating effects of shaking
infants, thus sending a message that good parents do not shake their babies.
20 1
The state also used compassion to induce the norm, letting parents know that
taking care of an infant is stressful and that frustration is a normal part of
202parenting, but that shaking is never an appropriate response.
Trigger emotions raise certain concerns for state norm entrepreneurship.
Arguably, there is greater unease when the state uses negative emotions to
trigger a norm than when it uses positive emotions. The state may send a
signal that people should be afraid to walk home alone at night, thus using fear
to ensure people watch out for themselves. Although there are benefits to this
awareness, it is not unproblematic. The state's use of this fear could reinforce
class and race stereotypes-implying that people should be particularly afraid
of walking through non-white, poor neighborhoods. Similarly, the fear could
reinforce ideas about gender differences-that only women should be afraid of
walking home alone. Sometimes using negative emotions such as fear may be
desirable-for example drawing upon the fear of new parents to prevent
shaken-baby syndrome. There may be reason for concern, however, when the
state vilifies parents who abuse or neglect their children, rather than drawing
200 See Nat'l Ass'n. of Children's Hosps. & Related Insts. (NACHRI), NACHRI 2010 Creating
Connections Conference, CA-Community Awareness of a Shaken Baby Syndrome Prevention Media
Campaign, http://www.childrenshospitals.net/AMITemplate.cff?Section=Site Map3&TEMPLATE=/CM/
ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=50617 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010) (describing the campaign).
201 See id. (describing the dangers of shaken-baby syndrome); Calm a Crying Baby,
www.calmacryingbaby.com (last visited Mar. 26, 2010).
202 See Andrew Sirotnak, Babies Cry... Be Prepared, COLO. PARENT, Apr. 2007, at 12 ("We all know
that babies cry-but sometimes the reality of being in a room with a screaming baby frays the nerves of any
caregiver, and sometimes, tragically, caregivers cross the line and take their frustration out on the child."); see
also id. ("By providing people with tips on how to calm a crying baby, we hope to provide ideas for caregivers
who are feeling overwhelmed. And, just as importantly, to let people know they aren't alone. Everyone gets
overwhelmed, tired and frustrated ... caring for a baby is hard work .... The most important thing to
remember is to be patient and never, ever shake a baby.").
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upon more positive emotions, such as compassion, to trigger the same social
norm. Part III examines this difference in greater detail, but it is worth noting
that there are challenges in trying to cultivate a positive message and positive
emotions. It may well be that it is easier to invoke negative emotions-such as
scaring parents about the possibility of child abduction-than it is to instill a
203feeling of empathy for others.
Emotion as a compliance enhancer. The emotionally powerful nature of
familial social norms means that the cost of noncompliance runs high. The
dog walker who fails to scoop her dog's poop may risk a loss of esteem from a
passerby, thus increasing the likelihood that she will pick up after her dog. But
the parent who fails to comply with community-specific norms about
discipline, education, or work-family balance risks much more: the judgment
that she is a bad parent.204  As a norm-imprinting tool, emotion thus makes
familial norms particularly salient. The esteem to be lost is so dear and so
personal that individuals make great efforts to comply with the relevant norms.
In this way, familial social norms are tremendously fraught because so much is
perceived to be at stake.
Emotion as a complicating factor. Perhaps the most important insight from
a study of emotion in familial social norms is that the predictive tools used by
norm theorists are often inapposite. For example, rational-choice theory tells
us that a person will comply with a social norm if it enhances her opportunity
to cooperate with others,205 but this account does not consider the intrinsic
motivation to be a good parent. A parent may look to social norms to
determine how a good parent acts, but the existence of norms is not what
motivates her to be a good parent. Similarly, the internalization theory
6
predicts that a woman will choose not to have an abortion to avoid the stigma
associated with abortions, but this theory does not help us understand the far
203 For further discussion of how the law can cultivate emotion, particularly positive emotions, see
Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Law in the Cultivation of Hope, 95 CAL. L. REv. 319, 361-71 (2007)
(exploring how the law can cultivate emotions and using "hope" as an animating example); and Cheshire
Calhoun, Making Up Imaginary People, in THnE PASSIONS OF LAW 217 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999)
(discussing emotional scripting in the context of same-sex relationships and showing how the law can cultivate
an idea of and belief in romantic love).
204 In certain socioeconomic circles, there is often so much pressure on women to be "good mothers" that
no mother feels like she is parenting well. See AYELET WALDMAN, BAD MOTHER: A CHRONICLE OF
MATERNAL CRIMES, MINOR CALAMITIES, AND OCCASIONAL MOMENTS OF GRACE 3-4 (2009). Condemnation
from a fellow parent stings even more because of the underlying fear of inadequate parenting. Id.
205 See supra text accompanying note 66.
206 See infra text accompanying notes 213-215 (discussing Cooter and the internalization theory).
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more complex and pervasive ways in which guilt works to shape and
perpetuate an anti-abortion norm.
Part III returns to these multiple roles of emotion in familial social norms,
demonstrating that a sound understanding of these roles is essential to any
norm entrepreneurship the state might undertake.
C. In Search of the Savannah
The analysis thus far reflects a long-running conflict in the discourse of
social-norm theory-the challenge of identifying middle ground between
rational-choice and law-and-society accounts of social norms. 2 07  Rational-
choice scholars craft relatively parsimonious theories of social norms,
intentionally setting aside a complex range of factors (including emotion) that
can motivate social norms and provide reasons for people to comply with
them.20 8  By contrast, law-and-society scholars view norms as the result of
numerous sociological factors, of which emotion is only one example.20 9
The dichotomy between the two approaches to social norms reveals
reciprocal shortcomings. If rational-choice accounts of social norms offer
limited insight because of their failure to account for emotion, law-and-society
accounts of social norms suffer from a different shortcoming. The law-and-
society accounts may provide a richer understanding of human behavior, but
the multiple variables considered by these sociological theories yield accounts
of norm creation and transmission that are overly contextual and not
207 See Scott, supra note 60, at 1607, 1622 n.39, 1637-39 (noting this long-standing challenge but also
expressing pessimism about the ability to find a middle ground given the fundamentally complex nature of
social norms and their context-specific nature).
208 But see Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1984-86, 1990 (2001) (proposing a
framework for incorporating at least some emotions into the rational-choice model of decision making by
"loosely drap[ing] the emotions over the rational choice framework," assuming that emotional states can at
least temporarily affect preferences). The economist Robert Frank is perhaps the best-known rational-choice
scholar to incorporate emotion into rational-choice theories. His central contention is that rational-choice
theories actually provide considerable room for "noble motives" in addition to self-interest. See FRANK, supra
note 17, at xi. For an extended discussion of reductionism in rational-choice theory as it relates to social
norms and an explanation of when reductionism is too much, see McAdams, supra note 66, at 678-87.
Finally, rational-choice theorists typically do not assert that sociological factors such as emotion are irrelevant,
but rather that they are complex and unpredictable; therefore incorporating them does not yield a sufficiently
parsimonious account of social norms. See Scott, supra note 60, at 1604-07.
209 One of the earliest and most important examples is Stewart Macaulay's research of contracts in
business relationships. See Macaulay, supra note 52. For work by a sociologist who studies law, see generally
DONALD BLACK, THiE BEHAVIOR OF LAW (1976) (discussing how sociological factors, not simply "the law,"
constrain and affect legal actors).
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determinative enough, thus jeopardizing any predictive value. 21  As Arthur
Leff aptly put it, rational-choice theories of social norms are a desert and law-
and-society theories a swamp.211
To begin with the analytic point, rational-choice theories do not reflect the
reality of familial social norms because they fail to account for the salience of
emotion.212 To be sure, some rational-choice accounts address the role of guilt,
contending that when a social norm is internalized, a person feels guilty for not
complying.2 13 But in the context of familial social norms, the emotion is not
simply a prod for compliance, it is the essence of the norm itself. Take
abortion, for example. Through the efforts described above, anti-abortion
advocates seek to cultivate or impose feelings of motherhood and care. These
campaigns anticipate that a woman will feel guilty for seeking to end her
pregnancy, in contravention of what "good mothers" do.
Rational-choice theories of norm compliance-of esteem, internalization,
and signaling --may partially account for the relevant dynamic in the
decision whether to carry a pregnancy to term. Once abortion is understood as
a mark of shame, women arguably will be less likely to choose to abort a fetus
for fear of the loss of esteem from others. And to the extent she has
internalized the social norm, a woman will sanction herself and choose not to
have an abortion, anticipating the guilt she will feel both for violation of the
norm and for engaging in the activity itself. Similarly, if abortion is shameful,
a woman may choose not to seek an abortion because having one may signal a
210 See Scott, supra note 60, at 1611.
211 See Ellickson, supra note 50, at 147 (noting that Arthur Leff was believed to have "used these
metaphors in casual conversation").
212 A few rational-choice scholars have looked at the role of emotion in particular contexts. For example,
scholars have argued that remorse plays a key role in regulating corporate culture: individuals will refrain from
engaging in fraud if they do not think others are engaging in fraud because they anticipate feeling remorseful if
they act contrary to others. See Huang & Wu, supra note 17, at 392-401. But scholars of social norms have
yet to mine the rich vein of emotion in any systematic fashion.
213 For example, Robert Cooter has argued that rational-choice theory wrongly assumes a rational "bad
man" calculating whether to obey a law by determining the costs and benefits of compliance and fails to
account for people who are intrinsically motivated to obey the law because they have internalized civic values.
See Cooter, supra note 63, at 1584-91. To account for this behavior within the rational-choice framework,
Cooter theorizes that internalization is understood to occur when doing so increases an individual's
opportunity to cooperate with others. See id at 1591-96. Similarly, rational-choice theorists have attempted
to explain the role "other-regarding preferences"--behavior that takes into account the costs and benefits to
others-play in social norms. See Lynn A. Stout, Social Norms and Other-Regarding Preferences, in NORMS
AND THE LAW 14 (John N. Drobak ed., 2006).
214 See supra Part I.A.2 (discussing these various theories, associated with Richard McAdams, Robert
Cooter, and Eric Posner, respectively).
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high discount rate and thus make the woman a less appealing long-term
partner.
But putting the dynamic in such terms almost immediately shows the
thinness of these accounts. Although esteem, internalization, and signaling
theories can partly explain why people follow social norms, they provide little
traction on the question of why a particular social norm emerges or the full
range of considerations that might lead individuals to follow these norms.
Women choose to have an abortion or carry a baby to term for deeply personal
reasons that can be influenced by a desire for social esteem or future partners.
But there are far more pressing considerations for women, including whether
they are ready to become parents (socially, emotionally, and economically),
whether they fear violence from a parent or partner, and whether they simply
do not want to be pregnant. Each of these considerations has deep, personal
emotional resonance shaped by social norms about the nature of parental
responsibility and proper gender roles.
Extant rational-choice theories of social norms also fail to account for the
distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. As rational-choice
theorists might suggest, parents do appear to be extrinsically motivated to
comply with social norms to avoid a loss of esteem from others and to signal
something about themselves. And parents likely internalize expectations and
values and thus seek to avoid guilty feelings by complying with norms.
All of this, however, misses the role of intrinsic motivation, which is
critical to understanding every aspect of social norms in the familial context.
Rational-choice theories are entirely focused on the external world, tying social
norms to relationships between individuals while ignoring emotions within a
particular individual. For example, the signaling theory of social norms posits
that a parent will act like a "good" parent by complying with social norms
because she wants to signal to others that she has a low discount rate.
Similarly, the esteem theory of social norms is rooted in parents' relationships
with others. The internalization theory of social norms appears to come closest
to describing parental motivation. But this theory, too, is about relationships
with others because the internalization is understood to occur when doing so
increases an individual's opportunity to cooperate with others.215
In the context of same-sex relationships, conceptions of esteem,
internalization, and signaling operate to shape choices about family formation.
215 See Cooter, supra note 63, at 1591-96.
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As with abortion and parenting, however, the emotional resonance of internal
motivations is just as determinative. For example, in a community that accepts
same-sex couples, a person cognizant of this norm may not venture to make a
homophobic remark for fear of losing the esteem of others or sending the
wrong signal. Anticipation of guilt might even play a role if the person has
internalized the community's values. But beyond these dynamics, whether to
accept or reject same-sex couples raises deep religious and cultural feelings
that simply cannot be captured in the language of signaling and the like.
Individuals on both sides feel that their very identities are at issue. Thus, it is
not simply the loss of esteem that is at stake, but rather the loss of self.
Additionally, the particular emotions at issue in this context reveal the
importance of paying attention to the source of norms. Although esteem
theory suggests that a norm may arise if there is a known consensus about the
worthiness of a particular behavior (here, accepting or rejecting same-sex
couples), it does not account for why a particular social norm emerges.
Understanding the emotional aspect of the social norms surrounding same-sex
couples helps explain why some people expend considerable resources fighting
the legal recognition of someone else's relationship. The opponents of same-
sex marriage understand that a social norm of acceptance is more likely to lead
to legal recognition, 216 and they further perceive this recognition as threatening
their own sense of self. Thus, an account that a social norm emerges when
there is sufficient consensus and knowledge does not begin to appreciate the
emotional stakes in developing that consensus.
Rather than find an abstract theory of social norms that perfectly accounts
for emotion-a savannah-it is more useful to first determine what is
necessary for a sound understanding of familial social norms, and then
determine what level of formalization is needed for the state to formulate
effective policies and laws. In other words, there is no perfect answer: There
are rich understandings of social norms, but they are so context-specific that it
is nearly impossible to formalize these understandings. By contrast, there are
usable formalizations, but these are not helpful understandings because they
bear so little resemblance to reality. Adding emotion provides some middle
ground for thinking about the role of the state in influencing families and also a
framework for operationalizing these insights. As the next Part demonstrates,
216 Indeed, this is one way to read Justice Scalia's prediction in his dissent in Lawrence v. Texas that
decriminalizing homosexual sex would inexorably lead to same-sex marriage. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 590, 600-05 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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adding emotion advances the conversation sufficiently to develop effective
policies in the family law context.
III. FAMILIAL SOCIAL NORMS IN CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE
Several normative implications flow from the intersection of emotion,
social norms, and state influence. Although some readers may be persuaded
that the state does influence social norms, there may be some resistance to the
idea that the state should do so. This Part, then, unpacks state norm
entrepreneurship, dissecting various concerns raised by the phenomenon. This
Part also explores the pernicious side of familial social norms-their
homogenizing potential. Despite these concerns, this Part argues that familial
social norms can be harnessed to serve important interests, such as protecting
children from abuse and neglect. This discussion demonstrates that state norm
entrepreneurship has considerable advantages when addressing trenchant and
controversial issues. Appreciating the confluence of social norms, emotion,
and state influence opens the door to more creative and effective state
interventions.
A. Emotion and State Norm Entrepreneurship
Intuitively, the idea of the state actively shaping ground-level social norms
by changing the emotional context of decision making presents a potentially
disturbing image, resonant of propaganda and manipulation. It is important,
however, to tease out the unease this state role can generate. There are three
independent questions: Is there a concern with what the state is doing (shaping
norms)? Is there a concern with how the state is doing it (using emotion as a
tool)? Or is there a concern with the underlying policies?
217
1. What the State Does
Nearly every law or state-sponsored program embodies some value, even if
the values conflict.218 Thus, the more precise question is whether the state can
217 A slew of political process questions exceed the scope of this Article. For example, there may well be
important differences between the state cultivating emotion and the state channeling emotion. This Article
undertakes the descriptive project of exploring the role of emotion in state-influenced social norms and leaves
for another day the analysis of the political process questions concerning the role of emotion in law making
and governing more generally.
218 For example, although the state may disapprove of unauthorized migration, the state may still choose
to translate public safety messages into Spanish.
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and should choose to further a value by influencing social norms in addition to,
or sometimes as an alternative to, direct legal regulation.
One objection is that the state must be transparent in its efforts to influence
and impose values. In the reproductive choice context, for example, when the
state enacts an infant safe haven law, it is purportedly addressing one concern
(infanticide), but it is also, arguably, contributing to a pro-life message. When
the state acts in this covert manner, the state potentially subverts the
democratic process. A strong argument can be made that in a representative
democracy, the state should not send hidden messages. To be sure, public
hearings might be held on such laws, and part of the public discussion might
uncover the message behind the law (that it equates women who seek abortions
with women who kill their newborns). But, aside from the unlikelihood of this
kind of transparency, the underlying message of the law would not necessarily
be apparent to members of the community who are not part of the public
discourse.
The state role in norm generation and direction raises a second, more
fundamental concern. The prevailing principle of family autonomy reflects a
larger cultural norm that seeks to preserve realms of individual and community
decision making outside the reach of state influence. Where and how to situate
the so-called public-private line is deeply contested, 219 but most people still
have an intuitive sense that at least as a default matter, the state should confine
itself largely to the realm of public issues, whereas norms often reside in a
somewhat more private, or at least personal, world.
This is an important concern, but at least in the familial context the state
already plays a pervasive role in setting the conditions for, and terms of, many
of the decisions and conflicts traditionally considered private. 22 This is not to
say that state intervention in norm dynamics is entirely unproblematic. The
reality of pervasive state regulation does, however, bring attention to the
proposition that what the state is trying to achieve through this kind of second-
order regulatory strategy is more critical than the fact that the state is doing it
through norms rather than direct regulation.
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2. How the State Does It
This, then, shifts the inquiry to whether the concern is less with the fact of
state intervention in norms and more with the means the state employs-the
manipulation of the often fraught emotions that drive those ideas and
behaviors. Although the state can help sway social norms using emotion as a
tool, this tool may be most effective when used sub rosa. For example, a fetal
sonogram law that explicitly stated that the purpose of the law was to instill
feelings of guilt and regret in any woman considering abortion likely would
provoke a backlash against such legislated emotion. The legislation may work
precisely because the emotional evocation is hidden.
Concerns with transparency and respect for the private realm resonate with
particular strength when the policy instrument has an emotional content. But
again, unpacking these concerns suggests that the problem is less with emotion
per se and more with the potentially troubling aspects of the specific emotional
cues the state may be sending. Opposing abortion by generating community
shame, or attempting to ban same-sex marriage by drawing on feelings of
disgust, may be pernicious less because these are emotional issues and more
because of a larger concern about undermining the equally important
emotional values of respect and dignity.
3. The Underlying Policies
The real concern with state norm entrepreneurship would seem to turn on
the "why"-the policies driving the state influence. In this way, how we
assess the effectiveness and normative desirability of state intervention in
driving and shaping norms turns largely on our evaluation of the underlying
goals at issue and the particular emotional resonance the state chooses to
pursue. Pro-life advocates are as likely to welcome the state's attempt to
contribute to a norm that stigmatizes abortion as pro-choice advocates are to
abhor this intervention. There may well be something inherently troubling
about the state trying to regulate abortion using emotion, but a person may find
this more or less troubling depending on their views on this issue. In other
words, although the abstract question is whether a state role in norm generation
and manipulation is desirable, perhaps the role is only as good or bad as the
goal to be achieved.
In short, although the state generally adheres to non-interventionist,
autonomy-based principles when directly regulating families, it nonetheless
plays a pervasive role in shaping social norms in areas where it does not
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directly intervene. The state does this in obvious ways, such as circulating
public service messages urging parents to talk to their children about drugs,
221
but the state also acts in myriad less obvious ways. Public rhetoric is a form of
norm entrepreneurship, but so too are laws that shape the work-family balance,
public funding decisions that feed or starve public schools, and even basic
land-use decisions about where to construct playgrounds or recreational
facilities. To ignore these ubiquitous dynamics will not eliminate the state
role, but rather push it further into the background.
The critical question, then, in evaluating the normative valence of any
individual instance of norm creation or manipulation turns less on whether the
strategy is legitimate and more on the underlying policy goals at issue. Social
norms are simply a means to an end, and it is more important to focus on the
ends than to pretend that the state never chooses these means.
To demonstrate that emotional-norm generation can be normatively
desirable in the right context (depending on the reader's point of view), section
C will discuss the use of emotion to cultivate empathy for parents who abuse
or neglect their children. But before turning to that discussion, it is important
to address one additional concern about familial social norms: the potential
loss of pluralism.
B. Norms and Normality: On the Homogenizing Effect of Familial Social
Norms
There is something troubling about the ubiquity and homogenizing power
of social norms. In one sense, "social norm" is a neutral term for something
that is anything but neutral. Familial social norms both embody normative
views on appropriate behavior and have a potential to be homogenizing-
requiring all to comply or face social sanction.222 To the extent a norm has
force because it represents a community consensus about a given individual
choice or behavior, that very consensus has the potential to marginalize or
stigmatize outliers who do not adhere to it and the boundaries it defines.
Further, the law may embrace pluralism through the doctrine of family
autonomy, but that autonomy arguably is far more circumscribed through
221 See, e.g., St. Louis County Minnesota Sherrifrs Office, Talking with Your Kids About Drugs,
http://www.co.st-louis.mn.us/slcportal/SiteMap/HomePage/Departments/Sheriff/CrimePreventionTips/
TalkingWithYourKidsAboutDrugs/tabid/958/Default.aspx (last visited May 24,2010).
222 See Kahan, supra note 66, at 373 ("Social norms notoriously underwrite all manner of intolerance and
persecution.").
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social norms. In other words, the law grants parents considerable discretion,
but social norms may not because, although our society embraces pluralism
across communities, any given community does not necessarily embrace
pluralistic norms.
To write about familial social norms is, of course, to invoke issues of race
and class, as these are two lines along which social norms may vary from one
community to another. These differences can have considerable consequences,
with the state using them to justify intervention in families. For example,
differing social norms about parenting-especially those that deviate from
norms in middle-class white families-have long been the basis for state
intervention in families. 223  Any state intervention in norm generation raisesthese types of concerns.
The homogenizing aspect of social norms is particularly troubling in the
family context because families have long been understood as a site for
cultivating pluralism.224 To be sure, social norms are context-specific, but
within any given community, a norm can be oppressively homogenizing. The
failure to comply with the norm may be a basis for social ostracism, ranging
from a relatively trivial rejection by a playgroup225 to the complete rejection by
226
a religious or social community.
This homogenizing aspect of norms raises the important question of
whether the state, through the apparatus of public law, should seek to reinforce
norms that are not consistent (as they so often are not) with principles of
223 See Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History ofthe Bifurcated Law ofLegal Relations,
90 GEO. L.J. 299, 328-47 (2002).
224 See Buss, supra note 168, at 27 (noting that leaving the upbringing of children to private actors "would
comport with our commitment to pluralism by allowing one generation to perpetuate its own diversity, and
even expand upon it, in the next generation"); Anne C. Dailey, Constitutional Privacy and the Just Family, 67
TuL. L. REv. 955, 959 (1993) ("The family's role in nourishing and sustaining diverse moral traditions is what
in part distinguishes our liberal democracy from totalitarian political regimes .... As the locus of potential
political resistance, the family acts as an important institutional check on the power of the state to mold
citizens in its own image.").
225 For a fictional account of this dynamic, see TOM PERROTTA, LITTLE CHILDREN (2004).
226 Circumcision is a good example because although it may be argued that this is a hidden preference not
easily knowable by others, in a religious community that expects a ritual, the failure to conduct it would be
telling. For example, the refusal to have a bris would inform others in a Jewish community that the parents are
not following this tradition. Depending on the views of the community, this may lead to a social sanction.
The more culturally homogenous the community, and the more insulated the community is from a wider social
network, the more complete the social norms-and thus the more complete the sanction-may be. See, e.g.,
Kirk Johnson, Estranged Father Testifies in Sect Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2008, at Al8 (describing a father
who was excommunicated from the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints possibly due
to religion, politics, or personality conflicts).
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tolerance and equality. As with concerns about emotional manipulation
discussed above, the normative question here requires attention to the specific
kind of pluralism or homogeneity at issue. Where the state sanctions social
norms that ostracize, stigmatize, or the like, this is more troubling than the
state reinforcing norms of parental concern, stability, and empathy. As
underscored by Elizabeth Scott's analysis of the coupling of gender norms and
marital commitment norms,227 the business of norm change through law is
rarely linear or simple. Nonetheless, legitimate concerns about pluralism
suggest that the state role in norm generation may be more acceptable where it
is consistent with tolerance and equality.
228
There is a separate concern with state intervention in familial social norms
where it relates to the content of those norms. Although social norms are, by
definition, supposed to embody a consensus on appropriate behavior, there is a
sense in which familial social norms may embody our hopes more than reality.
This is a different way in which familial social norms can be homogenizing,
and hence worthy of concern in considering the state role: the public discourse
on many such norms simply does not allow a full flowering of the real
complexity of emotion. This is particularly evident in norms around parenting
and the emotions that are said to attach to parenting. Prevailing conceptions of
parenting do not allow for parental ambivalence, creating friction where social
norms do not recognize such ambivalence. Instead, parents are understood to
love their children at all times and in all ways, and extant social norms
reinforce this idea.
This expectation of parental love does not accord with lived experience.
Intermittent ambivalence and, at times, antipathy are as much a part of
229parenting as love. Once we recognize the range of emotions at play in
parenting, we can see that social norms are tremendously important in steering
people in the right direction, but they are also potentially damaging when they
227 See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
228 Cf D. Don Welch, Ruling with the Heart: Emotion-Based Public Policy, 6 S. CAL. NTERDsc. L.J. 55,
75-87 (1997). Welch describes the danger of using emotional arguments to shape public policy, but he
contends that such arguments have a place in the process when they relate to the subject matter and further
discourse on the subject-and do not simply inflame one side of a debate. Id. Welch thus distinguishes a
claim of sorrow over an aborted fetus from an angry accusation that a woman who aborts a fetus is a "baby
killer." Id. at 79.
229 One of the earliest chroniclers of this ambivalence was the psychoanalytic theorist Melanie Klein. For
more on Klein and her theory of human intimacy, which posits that an individual first feels love for another,
then inevitably comes to hate and transgresses against him or her, and finally feels guilt about the transgression
and seeks to make amends, see Huntington, Repairing Family Law, supra note 14, at 1260-66.
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fail to reflect the full array of human emotions. Without this reflection, the
relevant social norm stigmatizes a parent who feels ambivalence toward her
children (but who has not, at times?).
Failing to recognize these more negative emotions in the external world of
social norms makes it all the more difficult for a parent to acknowledge these
feelings internally and thus, ideally, to seek external support. As Anne Alstott
has argued, there is "No Exit" for parents.230 Alstott makes a pragmatic,
economic argument about the consequences of the tenacity of the parent-child
bond. Her insight also fruitfully generates an understanding about the
consequences of the lack of emotional exit for parents, leading to a different
set of problems.
Where the state takes an overly simplistic approach to familial social
norms-reinforcing the message that there is only one acceptable way to be in
a relationship or to be a parent-this may reinforce the homogenizing effects
of such norms. This is not inevitable, though. The state can, and ideally
should, approach emotion with greater sensitivity, recognizing the full
complexity of emotion and, where it chooses to intervene, reinforcing the best
aspects of familial social norms. The next section explores one context in
which that might be possible.
C. Harnessing Emotion in Reframing Social Norms
To demonstrate the value of drawing upon a nuanced understanding of the
state role in shaping familial social norms, this section examines the state's
response to child abuse and neglect. In this context, values and attitudes
around parenting-and the norms these values and attitudes help shape-play
a central role in understanding the problem and the response of the legal
system. It is possible for the state both to prevent child abuse and neglect and
to respond more productively to abuse and neglect after it occurs.231 Despitethe possibility of a far more effective and efficient approach to child well-
230 See ANNE L. ALSTOTT, No EXIT: WHAT PARENTS OWE THEIR CHILDREN AND WHAT SOCIETY OWES
PARENTS 4, 22-26, 49-56 (2004).
231 To prevent child maltreatment, the state should offer a combination of general anti-poverty programs
and targeted prevention programs, both of which are effective means for reducing rates of child abuse and
neglect. See Huntington, supra note 219, at 1492-97, 1531-34 (describing a visiting nurse program and early
childhood education programs, which are both proven to dramatically lower rates of child abuse and neglect).
In cases where abuse and neglect have already occurred, the state should attempt to solve the underlying
problems, rather than simply removing the child from the home and providing minimal and largely ineffective
services to the parent. See Clare Huntington, Rights Myopia in Child Welfare, 53 UCLA L. REv. 637, 672-96
(2006).
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being, the state largely fails to undertake the necessary investments. Indeed,
attorneys, social workers, policy makers, and the general public have shown
considerable resistance to a preventive and problem-solving approach.232
There are many reasons for this resistance and lack of investment,233 but
one is based on the dominant understanding of child abuse and neglect: that
only unloving and uncaring parents would hurt or endanger their children.
This attitude or value of parental idealism-that parents love their children
always and in all ways-informs the public's perception of abusive and
neglectful parents. This value, in turn, informs parental norms such as "good
parents don't hit their children." The norm-shaping value of parental idealism
shapes the legal system's response to child abuse and neglect. By changing the
underlying understanding of parental behavior, it may be possible to shift the
child welfare system in a more preventive and problem-solving direction.
The following section first explores the emotional reaction to abusive or
neglectful parents and then demonstrates how the state could use emotion to
help shift the underlying values around parenting-from one of parental
idealism to one of parental realism-thus reframing the problem and
encouraging a different response.
1. Vilification as a Response to Child Abuse and Neglect
Child abuse and neglect are typically understood to be the product of
parental pathology, committed only by "sick monsters. 234 Little room is left
in the public imagination for viewing maltreatment as the product of poverty
and other systemic problems. Child welfare researcher Duncan Lindsey has
described the residual nature of the child welfare system as one where the
system intervenes in the lives of a subset of low-income families who
experience, or are at great risk for, abuse and neglect, rather than intervening
and offering services to all families who suffer from poverty. 235 In this way,
232 See Huntington, supra note 219, at 1489-97.
233 See id. at 1497.
234 See AxEL AUBRUN & JOSEPH GRADY, CULTURAL LOGIC LLC, Two COGNITIVE OBSTACLES TO
PREVENTING CHILD ABUSE: THE "OTHER-MIND" MISTAKE AND THE "FAMILY BUBBLE" 1 (2003), available at
http://www.preventchildabuse.org/about us/reframing/downloads/interviews.pdf, see also KEVIN T.
KIRKPATRICK, WmTE PAPER #2: REFRAMING CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT FOR INCREASED UNDERSTANDING &
ENGAGEMENT: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND THER IMPLICATIONS 4-5 (2004) (describing this perception),
available at http://www.friendsnrc.org/download/reframingl2.pdf
235 See DUNCAN LINDSEY, THE WELFARE OF CHILDREN 18 (2d ed. 2004).
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the child welfare system views abused and neglected children apart from the
society that helped create their circumstances.
236
The state helped create this frame. Once the War on Poverty became
politically vulnerable in the late 1960s, liberal politicians tried to help families
by channeling money through child abuse and neglect programs rather than
general anti-poverty programs. But to garner support for proposed
legislation,237 child abuse and neglect were packaged as a problem unrelated to
poverty, 238 which of course it is not.239 We are still experiencing the long-term
consequences of this reformulation. The current child welfare system
approaches child abuse and neglect as a phenomenon of individual
dysfunction, treating each case as a matter of poor or pathological parenting,
and thus it fails to respond to the systemic roots of the problem.
240
This state formulation encourages the vilification of abusive or neglectful
parents and is underscored by the value that a parent is assumed to love her
241
child completely and always. Put another way, the value of parental
idealism masks the range of emotions many parents feel and makes it possible
to demonize those parents the state identifies as having deviated from specific
norms that flow from this value. This vilification does not distinguish among
parents who abuse or neglect their children. Instead, the response lumps
together all parents in the child welfare system, making no distinction between
the low-income parent who struggles with substance abuse and chronic
homelessness (with predictable results for the children) and a parent who beats
a child nearly to death (and too often kills the child).242
236 See id. at2n.1.
237 This legislation became the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act. See Child Abuse Prevention
and Treatment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
238 See MARTIN GUGGENHEIM, WHAT' S WRONG WITH CHILDREN' S RIGHTS 184-85 (2005).
239 See Marsha Garrison, Reforming Child Protection: A Public Health Perspective, 12 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y
& L. 590, 612-19 (2005) (describing the strong correlation between poverty and neglect but arguing that the
correlation is incomplete).
240 See Huntington, supra note 231, at 666-70.
241 Transgressions against this norm spark intense reactions. See, e.g., Erik Eckholm, Older Children
Abandoned Under Law for Babies, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2008, at A21 (describing the public outcry in Nebraska
after several parents and custodians deposited older children at spots designated for infants); see also Gonzales
v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) ("Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love
the mother has for her child.").
242 See JANE WALDFOGEL, THE FUTURE OF CHILD PROTECTION: How To BREAK THE CYCLE OF ABUSE
AND NEGLECT 124-25 (1998) (describing the widespread misconception that the child welfare system
intervenes only where there is evidence of severe abuse and neglect; asserting that in reality such cases are not
the norm, constituting approximately ten percent of all cases; and noting that by contrast approximately fifty
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The vilification response also fails to acknowledge that about one-third of
all parents who abuse or neglect children were themselves abused or neglected
as children.243  Although there is often a strong emotional response of
sympathy and concern for a child who is abused or neglected, this sympathy
typically ends once the child becomes an adult.244
2. Parental Realism
A greater focus on prevention and repair may be possible through a change
in the dominant parenting value-from one of idealism to one of realism. The
goal is to build a narrative that recognizes parental ambivalence such that it is
harder to demonize parents who abuse or neglect their children. The values of
parental idealism and realism are not norms themselves, but they shape the
ground-level norms that influence behavior. These values also contribute to
emotional scripting for family members.245 In the words of Kathryn Abrams
and Hila Keren, emotional scripting is the "law's capacity to... prescribe the
emotions that should be felt in particular contexts, or the particular persons or
groups who are entitled to feel them., 246  For those who fit within the
prescribed emotion, there is a sense of belonging and correctness. But
"emotional outlaws" experience the opposite.247
Although scripting can constrain emotional responses,248 it can also create
more space for a variety of emotional responses. A norm of parental
ambivalence would better encompass the range of emotions most parents
experience. Drawing upon this emotional breadth, the idea is to script a
different emotional response with regard to parents who abuse or neglect their
children, to change the emotional response from one of disgust to one of
percent of all cases are "lower-risk neglect cases," many of which are poverty-related, with the remaining forty
percent falling in between).
243 See JILL GOLDMAN ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE ON CHILD ABUSE &
NEGLECT, A COORDINATED RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT: THE FOUNDATION FOR PRACTICE 28
(2003), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/foundation/foundation.pdf.
244 Indeed, some commentators have gone so far as to suggest that adults who were abused or neglected as
children should be subject to additional state monitoring and have their parental rights terminated more
expeditiously. See James G. Dwyer, The Child Protection Pretense: States' Continued Consignment of
Newborn Babies to Unfit Parents, 93 MINN. L. REV. 407, 409 (2008).
245 See Abrams & Keren, supra note 12, at 51-54.
246 Id. at51.
247 Id. at 52.
248 See, e.g., Carol Sanger, Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of
Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409, 466-70 (2009) (describing the demand that teenagers in judicial bypass
proceedings for abortions express remorse).
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empathy. This scripting would flow from a different value-that of parental
realism.
The state could encourage parental realism in several ways: generating
empathy for parents with minimal resources, acknowledging that all parents
need support, and demonstrating trust in low-income parents.
a. Generating Empathy
If a negative emotional response to parents who abuse or neglect their
children (or those at risk of doing so) is one of the obstacles to adopting a
prevention-oriented and problem-solving model of child welfare, then
responding to the emotional aspects of this resistance should be part of the
solution. If the public were better educated about the forces that lead to child
abuse and neglect-and the intergenerational nature of the problem-it might
be possible to cultivate a different emotional response. Education could help
reorient society's views of abuse and neglect away from the idea that abuse
and neglect are products of parental pathology. A new understanding should
be based upon social responsibility, in which a broader group-that includes
both the immediate community and the state-claims responsibility for the
larger circumstances that lead to abuse or neglect.
Through its laws and policies, then, the state should frame child abuse and
neglect (or at least the fifty percent of cases falling into the poverty-related
neglect category) 249 as the result of a breakdown in support networks. Stress
and frustration are common experiences in parenting, but most parents have
resources, in all senses of the word, to help them through these periods. Some
parents do not, and these parents neglect their children. If child neglect were
understood as a breakdown of parental resources, vilification might give way
to empathy.
250
One way the state might reinforce this understanding is by using nuanced
narratives. 251 Nightly news programs tend to focus on the horrific cases of
249 See supra note 242.
250 For an overview of the challenges and benefits of generating empathy, see J.D. TROUT, THE EMPATHY
GAP: BUILDING BRIDGES TO THE GOOD LiFE AND THE GOOD SOCIETY (2009).
251 See Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1574, 1650-51 (1987) (discussing
the legitimacy of empathy in legal discourse and noting that empathy is best cultivated through the
introduction of narratives about specific human stories). For example, Michelle Oberman has written about
"bad mothers," including mothers who kill their children. See Michelle Oberman, Judging Vanessa: Norm
Setting and Deviance in the Law of Motherhood, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 337, 338 (2009). Oberman
presents "Vanessa" as someone who clearly loved her child and who falls somewhere along the continuum
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child abuse and neglect, but even in these cases, the underlying stories tend to
be more complicated than the television reporter would have us believe.
252
Rather than compounding this narrative with a simplistic prosecution of the
parent, the state might choose a different punitive approach-one that
sufficiently penalizes the parent for abusing, neglecting, or even killing a child,
but that still conveys to the public the complexities in the case. This might be
accomplished, for example, through a community service sentence that
requires the mother to speak to parenting classes.
b. Reciprocity and Responsibility
To expand upon the idea of support for parents, the state could tap into a
social norm that exists in many (though not all) communities-the expectation
that parents and other community members help one another. In many
communities, a norm of reciprocity governs parenting, with parents and other
adults helping each other in numerous ways.253 This expectation of support,
however, does not extend to the state. Instead, the cultural ideal in the United
States is one of family autonomy, even though this is largely a myth. 4  The
question, then, is how to draw upon an existing social norm-the idea that
families help one another-and extend that expectation such that it is
politically palatable for the state to help families.
A first step in this direction would be to recognize the fallacy of family
autonomy. As Frances Olsen has argued, state intervention in the lives of
families is an inevitable by-product of organized government, and the myth of
"non-intervention" lies in the misconception of the "ideal of the private
between "good mother" and "bad mother," although neither the law nor society typically recognize this
continuum. See id. at 340-59. For further exploration of the "bad mother," see Marie Ashe & Naomi R.
Cahn, Child Abuse: A Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 Thx. J. WOMEN & L. 75, 80-112 (1993) (arguing that
the "bad mother," although archetypal, does not represent the reality of women's lives and further challenging
feminist legal theory to develop a fuller account of "bad mothers").
252 See Oberman, supra note 252, at 340-59 (describing the news coverage of one filicidal mother and
then recounting the author's impression of that mother's life and the circumstances surrounding her daughter's
death).
253 This norm may vary depending on socio-economic status. It has long been noted that at least some
African-American communities rely upon extensive social networks for survival. See JASON DEPARLE,
AMERICAN DREAM: THREE WOMEN, TEN KIDS, AND A NATION'S DRIVE TO END WELFARE 79 (2004)
(describing such support networks among African-American women in Milwaukee); CAROL STACK, ALL OUR
KIN: STRATEGIES FOR SURVIVAL IN A BLACK COMMUNITY 27-30 (1997) (describing her three-year study of the
systems of reciprocity used by low-income African-American families in their urban community); see also
ADRIAN NICOLE LEBLANC, RANDOM FAMILY: LOVE, DRUGS, TROUBLE AND COMING OF AGE IN THE BRONX
148 (2003) (describing such networks among Dominican immigrants in the Bronx).
254 See Huntington, supra note 168, at 1512-15.
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family." 255  This myth distracts from the important debate over what kind of
relationship we should seek between the state and families.256  Once the
baseline of regulation is established and state action is understood as
inevitable, it is far easier to contemplate what sort of regulation society prefers.
To this end, state officials should avoid rhetoric that reinforces a
misunderstanding of family autonomy. Instead of hewing to the politically
popular message "we leave families alone to make their own decisions," it
would be far better to send the message that the state regulates families based
on "relative competencies." 257  Where the state is in a superior position to
determine needs, the state makes the decision. But where parents are better
positioned to understand what a family needs, the family makes the decision.
258
Changing the rhetoric and acknowledging that all families need support, from
one another and from the state, 259 would make broader support programs morepolitically feasible.
c. Demonstrating Trust
A third way for the state to cultivate parental realism is to send a message
of trust by not requiring parents to give up their decision-making authority in
exchange for tangible benefits. As currently structured, when the state
supports low-income families, it second-guesses them, attaching onerous and
intrusive conditions to state support. 26  The state need not take this approach.
Instead, the state could provide the social and economic support needed to
prevent child abuse and neglect, which would include a combination of general
anti-poverty and more targeted programs. The state should not overly
255 See Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 835,
835-36 (1985). Frances Olsen has argued that the "private family," often the basis for nonintervention, is a
myth, or at least an incoherent ideal. Thus the terms "intervention" and "nonintervention" are largely
meaningless. Harkening back to the legal realists' deconstruction of a laissez-faire approach to government as
a coherent legal framework, Olsen states that "[a]s long as a state exists and enforces any laws at all, it makes
political choices. The state cannot be neutral or remain uninvolved, nor would anyone want the state to do so."
Id.
256 See id. at 863.
257 See Buss, supra note 168, at 33.
258 To give one example from the child welfare context, if a parent needs substance abuse treatment, the
state is typically in a better position to determine, based on extensive studies, which substance abuse treatment
programs are effective and therefore should be subsidized by the state. By contrast, a family is far better able
to determine for itself what supports are needed from the state-whether the family needs assistance with
housing, childcare, educational needs, or domestic violence intervention.
259 See Huntington, supra note 219, at 1515 (describing how every family needs and receives state
support).
260 See id. at 1505-10.
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condition these supports on recipients engaging in any particular behavior, but
rather on the understanding that parents will generally make good decisions for
themselves and their children and that parents are in the best position to assess
their family's needs.261  Despite common visceral reactions, this principle
should apply to parents who have abused or neglected their children in the
past. In this way, enacted law-the statutory and administrative rules
accompanying a benefit program-would send a powerful message of trust and
cooperation, not distrust and stigma.
Regulating all families in a manner that promotes self-determination would
help promote parental realism, mediating the emotions of disgust and revulsion
and, ideally, fostering empathy and concern. Moreover, once the state begins
to send the message that all parents are worthy of respect, it will be possible to
create a positive feedback loop between laws and values.262 The law provides
some indication of society's values and, possibly, some means for changing
those values. If the state were to send the message, for example, that parents
suspected of abusing or neglecting their children deserve adequately paid
counsel with access to resources, this would help convey that these parents are
worthy of state investment.263  Although a seemingly small message, the
ramifications could be enormous if it helped dismantle the current emotional
response to such parents. The strengths-based practice that is beginning to take
hold in the social-work field could then begin to permeate society as a
whole,264 leading to even greater changes and more support. Ideally this
support would come long before abuse or neglect occurs.
261 The two key aspects of the relationship between families and the state are, first, that some families
need state support to help them care for their children and, second, that in providing this support, parental self-
determination in decision making should be enhanced. For an extended discussion of how to strike this
balance, see Huntington, supra note 219, at 1524-31.
262 As Katharine Bartlett argues, the law "produces and reproduces the dispositions and values of its
citizens." Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 293 (1988).
263 Court-appointed counsel for parents are typically paid very little. For example, in Colorado a court-
appointed attorney can earn a maximum of $2,870 for the life of a case, which often stretches on for years.
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE, SUPREME COURT OF COLO., CHIEF JUSTICE DIRECTVIE 04-05: APPOINTMENT
AND PAYMENT PROCEDURES FOR COURT APPOINTED COUNSEL 5-6 (2009). Of course private attorneys can
charge more, but in light of the connection between poverty and child abuse and neglect, most parents cannot
afford their own attorneys.
264 See, e.g., CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY, DIFFERENTIAL RESPONSE TO REPORTS OF CHILD
ABUSE AND NEGLECT 1-17 (2008), available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/issue briefs/differential
response/differential response.pdf (discussing the "differential response" approach to child welfare, which
takes a more collaborative approach to working with low- and moderate-risk cases in the child welfare
system).
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In sum, cultivating empathy by scripting the emotional response to parents
would lay the groundwork for a different approach to preventing and
responding to child abuse and neglect. The idea is not to create norms that
condone child abuse and neglect, but rather to help shape parenting norms that
reflect the emotional reality of parenting and to help portray parenting as the
enormously difficult job that it is.
When policy makers, commentators, and advocates appreciate the layers of
family law, they develop a greater understanding of the operation of families
and the impact of family law. This understanding, in turn, leads to more
effective approaches to thorny issues involving regulation of families. Rather
than assuming that any one solution-such as a change in divorce laws or the
standards for removing children from their homes-will address the needs of
all families, being attentive to the textures of families and family law lays the
foundation for an appropriately complex response by the state. As this Part has
demonstrated, subtle state efforts to shape social values and norms, particularly
through their emotional valence, can be highly effective and may potentially
engender less resistance.
CONCLUSION
From dating to marriage to parenthood, social norms deeply influence the
behavior of individuals in the relationships that family law seeks to regulate.
The powerful emotions that run both in families and about families give force
and content to familial social norms. To be sure, some individuals revel in
eschewing social norms-dressing a boy baby in pink, choosing
unconventional names, or having fourteen children. But these rebellions only
underscore the influence of social norms on behavior, and the rebellions are
themselves often laden with emotion. In short, social norms are integral to
family life, and emotion is integral to familial social norms.
These emotion-laden social norms do not stand apart from the law. Instead,
the state plays an important, if often unseen, role in shaping familial social
norms. Although there may be some unease with this state role, it is unlikely
to disappear. The question, then, is how the state can use social norms for
legitimate and important ends. An appreciation of the emotional component of
familial norms, and the state's role in creating and perpetuating them, offers a
robust starting point both for debating sensitive issues and for developing more
creative and effective state interventions.
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Understanding the role of emotion in familial social norms also creates a
roadmap for exploring emotion in other kinds of social norms, an important
undertaking regardless of the context. Although it may not be possible to
articulate a precise theory that finds a savannah between the desert of rational-
choice accounts and the swamp of law-and-society accounts, it is essential to
account for emotion in all its various roles. Indeed, to lose sight of emotion is
to risk misunderstanding social norms altogether.
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